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**DRAFT STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) FOR
THE AFRICAN UNION SUPPORT AND STABILISATION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AUSSOM)**

DRAFT

KEY REFERENCES

- A. Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000);
- B. Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002);
- C. African Union Peace and Security Council Communiqués 1068 (2022), 1094 (2022), 1121 (2022), 1143 (2023), 1173 (2023), 1177 (2023), 1205 (2024) and 1217 (2024);
- D. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2628 (2022), 2670 (2022), 2687 (2023), 2710 (2023), 2719 (2023) and 2741 (2024);
- E. African Union Doctrine on Peace Support Operations (2021);
- F. Somalia Security Conference, Communiqué (12 December 2023);
- G. Somalia Security Sector Development Plan (2023);
- H. Concept of Operations of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (2022-2023);
- I. Federal Government of Somalia-African Union, Joint Technical Assessment (September 2023);
- J. Federal Government of Somalia-African Union, Joint Technical Assessment (March 2024);
- K. FGS National Threat Assessment Report (2024);
- L. African Union Strategic Framework for Compliance and Accountability in Peace Support Operations (2023);
- M. African Union, Joint Strategic Assessment Report (May 2024).

ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
AO	Area of Operations
AOG	Armed Opposition Groups
AoR	Area of Responsibility
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
AUCF	African Union Compliance Framework
AU PCRDP	African Union Post-Conflict, Reconstruction and Development
CAS	Comprehensive Approach to Security
CAS	Close Air Support
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
C-IED	Counter Improvised Explosive Device
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
FOBs	Forward Operating Bases
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member States
HoM	Head of Mission
HRDDP	Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
IED	improvised Explosive Device
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JFLB	Joint Forward Logistics Base
JOLB	Joint Operational Logistic Base
JOCC	Joint Operation Coordination Centre
JSA	Joint Strategic Assessment
JSOC	Joint Support Operations Centre
JTA	Joint Threat Assessment
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MEU	Mission Enabling Unit
MSR	Main Supply Route
NRA	Newly Recovered Area
NSS	National Stabilization Strategy
ORA	Operational Readiness Assessment
PCC	Police Contributing Country
RAM	Rapid Assessment Mission
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SFF	Somali Security Forces
SNAF	Somali National Armed Forces
SPF	Somali Police Force

SRCC	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union
SSDP	Security Sector Development Plan
STP	Somali Transition Plan
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

DRAFT

I. PREAMBLE

1. On 15 November 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2710 (2023) which urges the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), in collaboration with the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, and other international partners, to assess the needs for ongoing international support in Somalia's security sector. The resolution further emphasizes the importance of Somali ownership in the post-ATMIS phase, with the objectives of developing a comprehensive plan with actionable and feasible goals, clear timelines, and resource requirements.

2. On 12 December 2023, the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, convened the Somalia Security Conference in New York, United States of America. The conference was co-hosted by the African Union, European Union, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Nations, United States of America, and attended by 28 of Somalia's friends and partners.

3. On 26 March 2024, the FGS presented to the African Union Peace and Security Council a proposal for a post ATMIS security arrangement. The proposed security framework is to mark a departure from the past AU missions while building on the achievements made by AMISOM and ATMIS. It recognizes the evolving local context and aims to be better aligned with current needs and more fit for purpose. Accordingly, the proposal requests the new mission to be limited in scope, size and time. It further suggests that the new mission should offer targeted support to address specific capability gaps and outline a clear exit strategy.

4. The Joint Technical Assessment (JTA) report of March 2024 and the Joint Strategic Assessment (JSA) of May 2024 underscored the point that Al-Shabaab and other armed groups cannot be defeated by military means alone. As ATMIS implements its drawdown, Al-Shabaab continues to increase its numbers and maintain its capabilities. The Somalia Security Sector Development Plan (SSDP) of November 2023, adopts a multifaceted approach to defeating Al-Shabaab, not limited to military actions only. These include ideological and financial warfare and the disruption of Al-Shabaab operations. The approach encompasses six key sections to include urban centre security, countering financing of terrorism, strategic communication, ideology, liberation operation and stabilization as part of the grand strategy. The FGS considers the importance of a comprehensive approach to security and unity of purpose for the success of the security sector development program to achieve peace and security in Somalia.

II. PRINCIPLES

5. The new mission will be underpinned by the following principles.

- a. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Government of Somalia must be respected at all times, in line with Article 3(b) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and relevant international Law.
- b. National ownership and leadership by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS);
- c. Respect for African Union's continental mandate and leadership;

- d. Mutual accountability between and amongst all stakeholders in the reform and development of the Somalia's security sector.
- e. Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law and adherence to the AU Compliance Framework (AUCF) and the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP);
- f. The mission framework should be derived from the Somali Security Development Plan presented by the FGS at the Somalia Security Conference in New York USA in December 2023.

III. INTRODUCTION

6. The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) in Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1205 (2024), adopted at its 1025th meeting of 03 April 2024, requested the African Union Commission (AUC) “to undertake a comprehensive and detailed planning based on the situation on the ground, including undertaking threat assessments, in consultation with the FGS, the ATMIS Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and the UN, and report back to Council by the end of April 2024.”

7. Pursuant to the above-referred Communiqué, the AU Commission deployed a team to Somalia from 24 to 30 April 2024 to conduct the requested Joint Strategic Assessment (JSA) for a possible post-ATMIS AU-mandated peace support operation in Somalia, in collaboration with the FGS and the United Nations.

8. The PSC considered the JSA at its 1217th meeting of 20 June 2024 and, through Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1217 (2024), requested the AU Commission, in consultations with ATMIS, FGS and all relevant stakeholders, to submit by the end of July 2024 a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) that proposes a mandate and configuration for the new mission, and clear benchmarks and timelines for the transition from ATMIS to the new mission as well as the duration of the new mission. In furtherance of this objective, the AU Commission deployed a team to Somalia from 13-16 July 2024 to conduct wider consultations with all stakeholders.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA AND RELATED ANALYSIS

A. Political Landscape

9. Since the African Union's deployment of a mission in Somalia in 2007, the country has been engaged in state-building and peacebuilding efforts. Key initiatives include the constitutional review process, finalizing the implementation of the national security architecture, developing a unified democratic electoral model, and achieving political and social reconciliation to fully implement a federal system. Since the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in May 2022, significant progress has been made in these critical areas, including the Somalia's accession to the East African Community, the lifting of the arms embargo, its election to the United Nations Security Council for the 2025-2026 term, and finalization of the debt relief.

10. Underpinning this progress has been the National Consultative Council (NCC), which since May 2022, has improved relations between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States. Despite some challenges, the NCC has facilitated discussions aligned with the FGS's 2022-2026 work programme, which prioritizes security, justice, reconciliation, economic self-sufficiency, social development, and international relations to protect Somalia's sovereignty and unity. This inclusive process supports Somalia's commitment to democratization, preparing for one-person, one-vote elections in 2026.

11. In recent years, with African Union support, successive FGS administrations have prioritized national issues and strengthened regional and international relations. Despite progress, challenges remain, including Puntland's absence from regular NCC meetings and the unresolved dispute over the Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Member State of Somaliland and Ethiopia.

12. The FGS must engage with key stakeholders to resolve differences over national priorities, finalize the Constitution and prepare for universal elections in 2026. Continuous support from the AU and international partners is crucial to addressing these challenges. Therefore, the coming months will be pivotal for Somalia.

B. Security Landscape

13. Somalia's security landscape has undergone considerable developments since 2007, with significant efforts of successive Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) administrations to strengthen security across Somalia. With the evolution, African Union and key regional and international partners have continued to partner with the Somali Security Forces (SSF), as part of a counter-terrorism enterprise against Al-Shabaab and other violent extremist groups in Somalia. Despite the significant positive development achieved, Al-Shabaab continues to pose significant threat in southern Somalia and beyond borders. The group remains a key affiliate of Al-Qaeda-Core and has reportedly formed operational connections with elements of the Islamic State in Somalia as part of its campaign to destabilise the country.

14. The security situation in Somalia remains relatively calm in areas under FGS and ATMIS presence, however unpredictable in the large ungoverned spaces in the theatre. Al-Shabaab have continued to use asymmetric tactics, conduct complex attacks, use of IEDs, VBIEDs, IDF and drones to conduct surveillance on FGS installation, SSF and ATMIS activities. In short to medium term, it is assessed that Al-Shabaab will have capacity to arm commercially available drones and use them as weapon of choice against SSF and ATMIS troops. Islamic State in Somalia still maintains sleeper cells in the Area of Operation (AO) though with much presence in Puntland. Other threats to Somalia state building efforts include state fragility, piracy, porous border, climate change, and social divisions.

15. Since 2022, the FGS has developed a new strategy to counter Al-Shabab militarily, financially, and ideologically while preparing to take over security responsibilities from ATMIS. This has translated to the recovery of over 65,000 Square Kms and a marked improvement of the security in Mogadishu. To this end, the FGS recognises that ATMIS and international partners support have contributed to gains made. On the other hand, the SSF continue to increasingly demonstrate ability to maintain security responsibilities in handed over FOBs and critical facilities. However, this situation may significantly deteriorate with the planned exit of ATMIS on 31 December 2024. ATMIS' exit will stretch SSF thin on the ground resulting to minimal manning strength, a situation that should be addressed by a follow-on mission with the support of partners.

16. Al-Shabaab's strategic goal remains the overthrow of the FGS and its Federal Member States (FMS). It has positioned itself in strategic locations in southern Somalia in places like, Galmudug, Mogadishu, Jilib and along Rivers Juba and Shabelle among other areas. The Al-Shabaab has also been able to use its areas of influence to carry out extortion and intimidation of the local population and incite propaganda to coerce the public into using its 'courts'. Meanwhile, the Islamic State in Somalia continues to infiltrate regions such as Puntland and along the Gulf of Aden, taking advantage of security and governance vacuums created by the absence of state authority in some areas.

17. In August 2022, the Somali Security Forces (SSF) launched a major offensive, supported by ATMIS, key international partners and local communities. The offensive resulted in the FGS extending its state authority to deliver stabilisation activities in recovered areas across HirShabelle and Galmudug. Despite these major operational advances, across ATMIS area of responsibility, Al-Shabaab continues to demonstrate resilience and adaptability, and occasionally poses threats to Main Supply Routes (MSRs).

V. KEY ASSUMPTIONS

17. The following assumptions have been made in planning:

- a. AU PSC mandates the deployment, and the UN Security Council subsequently endorses the PSC decision by authorizing the Mission;
- b. FGS consents to host and cooperate with the Mission in implementing its mandate.
- c. AU, UN and relevant international partners mobilize the required resources and support.
- d. Sufficient and sustainable financial and logistics support to the Mission and to the Somali Security Forces.

- e. Troop and Police contributing countries generate the required capacities and capabilities, including the deployment of sufficient force multipliers and enablers; and
- f. FGS mobilizes and provides necessary resources and generates adequate capacities and capabilities to take over security responsibilities.

VI. MANDATE

33 The Mission shall, within its Area of Operation (AO), **“Contribute to the creation of enabling conditions for effective stabilization and sustainable peace in Somalia, by significantly degrading Al-Shabaab and other Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) and accelerating the assumption of primary security responsibility by the Somali authorities.”**

33 More specifically, the Mission should:

- a. Support FGS to further degrade Al-Shabaab and provide security and prioritize the protection of civilians in Somalia, in compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law;
- b. Assist in the stabilization of security in Somalia, enabling the state-building priorities, including targeted capacity building, and ensuring an orderly transfer of security responsibilities to an increasingly capable Somali Security Forces.
- c. Facilitate, within the limit of its capabilities, humanitarian operations and the delivery of assistance to the affected populations; and
- d. Protect AU and UN personnel, installations and assets.

VII POLITICAL DIRECTIVE

33 Political Objective. The Mission will support FGS in fulfilling its security and stabilisation objectives and contribute to the following:

- a. Assist in strengthening State authority, as well as support national authorities in the protection of civilians, the reinforcement of security and public order through the implementation of appropriate measures and in line with human rights and international humanitarian law principles and standards; and contribute to the FGS stabilisation efforts.

VIII STRATEGIC END STATE

33 The security conditions are re-established for Somalia to exercise full authority over its territory and assume responsibilities for the protection of the population, properties and livelihoods and to address national and regional security concerns, and to allow the FGS to continue to implement its overall stabilization and development programmes.

IX. OPERATIONAL END STATE

22. A significantly degraded Al-Shabaab and other AOGs which no longer pose a threat to Somalia's national security, and conditions are established for enabling a more stable Somalia with primary security responsibility assumed by SSF.

23. Increasingly capacitated SSF and other State institutions as set out in the National and Federal Stabilization Strategy and the Somalia Security Sector Development Plan.

X. EXIT STRATEGY

24. The SSDP establishes a comprehensive plan for Somalia's security transition and stabilization with the overarching goal for Somalia to assume full ownership and responsibility for its security.

25. The Mission's exit strategy is, therefore, linked to the successful implementation of the SSDP and achievement of the Mission's benchmarks, focusing on enhancing the capacity of the SSF to maintain a sustainable security environment in the country. The performance of the Mission and its exit strategy will therefore be based on progressive steps in SSF capacity to take over full responsibility for security in Somalia.

XI. MAJOR TASKS

26. The major tasks of the Mission will be as follows:

- a. Support SSF by employing appropriate force enablers and multipliers;
- b. Support SSF, within its capabilities, in its offensive operations against Al-Shabaab;
- c. Expand the establishment and strengthen the joint operations and logistics bases in all sectors to enhance the conduct of joint and independent operations, as well as the reporting and monitoring of service delivery and logistics support;
- d. Support vetting, recruitment, training, advising of the Somali Police Force (SPF) as requested;
- e. Leverage the capacities and support of relevant departments of the AU Commission and other AU Organs where appropriate, and as will be determined by the FGS and the AU;
- f. Support the forces pledged by T/PCCs to carry out their mandates in compliance with international law including IHL and IHRL, with regard to the protection of civilians, especially women and children, in line with the AUCF, and cooperate with the UN entities in Somalia in implementing the HRDDP across the preparatory, conduct and review phases of operations;
- g. Support the facilitation of safe passage, humanitarian access and humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations including through protection of humanitarian personnel and objects, as may be required;

h. Monitor incidents and receive reports on allegations of violations of IHRL, IHL, standards of conduct and discipline, investigate and take appropriate response and remedial actions to ensure accountability.

XII. COMPONENT-SPECIFIC TASKS

27. Military: It is envisioned AU troops will fulfil a series of specific roles in the Mission, these are;
- a. Support SSF, within its capabilities, in degrading Al-Shabaab by disrupting their freedom of movement, and restricting their access to illicit finance.
 - b. Support the SSF with enabling combat support capabilities including conducting air operations to achieve air dominance over the Mission AoR;
 - c. Assist the SSF in providing security for political processes at all levels as well as national stabilisation programmes;
 - d. Support and assist SSF to ensure its ability and readiness to assume full responsibility for Somalia's security;
 - e. Support the provision of security in the federal capital, capitals of FMS and agreed key population centres, as feasible;
 - f. Support the provision of security to key installations and critical infrastructure such as airports and seaports;
 - g. Protect, within its capabilities, civilians under imminent threats of physical violence;
 - h. Protection of AU and UN personnel, installations and assets.
28. Police: It is envisioned that the AU police will fulfil a series of specific roles in the Mission, which include:
- a. Support the SPF in managing public order and security, protect communities and maintain internal security;
 - b. Support the SPF on policy formulation, training curriculum development and specialized trainings, leadership and management courses agreed with the SPF;
 - c. Support the efforts of SPF on police generation;
 - d. Contribute, within its capabilities, to the protection of civilians;

- e. Support, within its capabilities, humanitarian operations of UN and AU accredited agencies by providing escort;
 - f. Protect AU and UN personnel, installations and assets.
29. **Civilian:** It is envisioned that civilian staff will fulfil a series of specific roles in the Mission, which include:
- a. Provide management and leadership coordination of the Mission;
 - b. Monitor and report on political developments;
 - c. Provide support to the Mission in the development of mission-specific strategies, including on protection of civilians and child protection, and to develop relevant in-mission training schedules for mission personnel on AUCF;
 - d. Coordinate the services of the Mission and humanitarian actors in support of the FGS to deliver immediate emergency life-saving and humanitarian assistance;
 - e. Support to ensure compliance with IHL and IHRL, including the AUCF and HRDDP, as well as applicable international norms and standards of conduct and discipline;
 - f. Monitor allegations of violations of IHL and IHRL and take appropriate actions, including mitigation, investigation, response and remedies as may be required; and
 - g. Support the FGS in implementing the SSDP as required.

XIII. MISSION COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE

30. **Strength:** The authorized strength of the Mission is up to 11,911 personnel, comprising of 85 civilians, 11,146 military and 680 police personnel, deployed in 4 Sectors with 14 Main Operating Bases (MOBs) and 9 Tactical Operating Bases (TOBs).

31. **Sectors:** Sector I: Mogadishu; Sector II: Kismayo; Sector III: Baidoa; Sector IV: Jowhar.

32. Main and Tactical Operating Bases (MOBs/TOBs) layout per Sector are as follows:

Sector I: MOB 1 (Mogadishu FHQ, Mogadishu (Sector HQ); MOB 2 (Mogadishu Aden Adde International Airport, Mogadishu Seaport); MOB 3 (Baledogle Airfield); MOB 4 (Barawe Airport); TOB 1 (Aljazeera II); TOB 2 (Aljazeera III); TOB 3 (Barawe Seaport); TOB 4 (Arbiska).

Sector II: MOB 5 (Kismayo: Sector HQ, Kismayo New Airport); MOB 6 (Kismayo Seaport). MOB 7 (Garbaharey); TOB 5 (Baardheere).

Sector III: MOB 8 (Baidoa: Sector HQ, ; Baidoa Airport); MOB 9 (Xudur); TOB 6 (Waajid); TOB 7 (Berdale); TOB 8 (Dinsoor)

Sector IV: MOB 10 (Jowhar: Sector HQ; Jowhar Airport); MOB 11 (Mahaday); MOB 12 (Beletweyne); MOB 13 (Dhusamareeb); MOB 14 (Bulo Burto); TOB 9 (Xawadleey)

33. The above disposition may be revised as per the prevailing security situation.

XIV. CAPABILITIES

34. Capabilities as outlined in the AU CONOPS will be aligned to tasks. Exact distribution will be determined based on the outcome of the initial planning phase.

35. The Quick Reaction Forces must remain agile, mobile and non-sector aligned. This will allow the Force Commander, in conjunction with the JOCs, to re-deploy troops to AOR as need dictates, and as the security situation stabilises.

36. The Mission will conduct combat operations, including offensive operations, when required within its capabilities and in accordance with the rules of IHL and IHRL.

37. The Mission will have requisite specialized units to specifically address the need for core capabilities in the provision of security to strategic locations and installations; air support including air strikes and close air support; logistics supply, long range ISR and enablers; robust forces (Quick Reaction Forces) to conduct kinetic operations, respond to emerging threats, and ensure provision of specialized training for enhanced combat capabilities and mentorship to the SSF.

37. Specific details on components strengths are as below:

Components	Units	Strength	Observations
Military	Combat Units	8877	8.5 Battle Groups
	Mission Enabling Units (MEUs)	416	Delivery of UNSOS Support
	Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs)	800	Ground and Airborne
	Mission Air Component	595	See Table (2)
	Aviation Support Component	273	See Table (2)
	Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) Units	60	See Table (2)
	Mission and Force HQ Staff	125	Command and Staff
	Total Military	11,146	
Police	Police Leadership, FPU, IPOs	680	Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo
Civilian	International Staff	85	At MHQ and in each Sector HQ
	TOTAL	11,911	

38. The Mission shall have a clear Command and Control Structure with an empowered Force Headquarters exercising effective Operational Command (OPCOM) over the Forces to ensure strategic coherence for the implementation of the mandate. The Force Commander should be selected among candidates from the TCCs operating in the Mission, in line with relevant AU rules and regulations on recruitment.

39. Implementation of the Mission structure shall be phased to enable the transition without adversely impacting the operational gains and effectiveness of the Force. The required administrative, financial and management support components will also be included in the structure of the Mission to ensure that the Mission and SSF personnel in operations and covered under the support package are adequately resourced and administered to implement their mandate and tasks effectively. It shall also include the provision of required safety and security support to enable the fulfilment of the mission.

40. In addition to the ground combat forces, there will be provision of force enablers and multipliers that will include:

- a. Close Air Support (CAS), Air Quick Reaction Forces, Casualty and Medical Evacuations (CASEVAC/MEDEVAC), armed escort, air reconnaissance, air mobility and troops insertion, among others;
- b. Long-range Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to cover the entire AoR;
- c. Enhanced Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IEDs) capabilities;
- d. Enhanced Mission Enabling Units (MEUs) and combat engineering capabilities.

41. The required assets are as follows

Unit	Subunit	Personnel Strength	Air Assets			
			Attack Helicopter	Utility Helicopter	ISR UAS	Light Attack Aircraft
Air Support	ALPHA	105	2	1	1	0
	BRAVO	105	2	1	1	0
	CHARLIE	105	2	1	1	0
	DELTA	105	2	1	1	0
	ECHO	105	2	1	1	0
	FOX	70	0	0	1	2
	Total 1	595	10	5	6	2
Aviation Support	SIERRA	273				
Unmanned Aerial Systems	INDIA	60				
Special Air OPS (QRF)	QRF	125				

	Total 2	458	
General Total		1053	

TIME FRAMES

42. At the Somali Security Conference in 2023 the timeline for the development of SSF was outlined. The SSF are improving but not yet capable of independently providing security to key population centers and infrastructure, particularly in parallel to offensive operations against Al-Shabaab. Therefore, SSF operations will continue to require external logistical enablement while sovereign capability is developed, which according to the SSDP will take 3to 5 years.

43. The mission timeframe should mirror the SSDP’s timeframe in order to provide the necessary capacity substitution that will mitigate the risk of failure and the need for additional support beyond the end of the mission. The duration of mission will be based on agreed on conditions with clear benchmarks and indicators, with mechanisms for performance checks to ensure mutual accountability and effectiveness.

44. Progress towards the end state should be monitored every six months using benchmarks, including against implementation of the SSDP, to ensure that the mission remains on track. If there is concern that the conditions for the conclusion of the mission are unlikely to be met, then consideration should be given as early as possible to the incremental extension of the mission. If required, this will occur at the request of the FGS.

XV. MISSION PHASES

45. Phase 0: Analysis, Planning, Preparation

a. Proposed Timeline: 1 Sept 2024 – 31 Dec 2024.

b. **Intent:** A reinforced JOC (SNAF with AU mission and International Partners when necessary) will **COORDINATE** military actions across AOR. **LIAISE** between all parties in Somalia to ensure greater coherence. Prepare for commencement of detailed mission planning for troops to be realigned to agreed locations and identify any additional capability required.

c. **Scheme of Manoeuvre:** Conduct joint planning. Pause on existing ATMIS Phase 3b September 2024 drawdown to provide planning capacity for the Mission for eventual drawdown of ATMIS on 31st Dec 2024 and the deployment of the new Mission on 1 January 2025 so as to ensure it is appropriately orientated with operational priorities outlined.

d. **Focus of Effort:** Support the FGS in the production of campaign plans, agreed strategic and operational plans for Mission, including capability locations and supporting functions. Alignment of AU troops to Main Operating Bases (MOBs) and Tactical Operating Bases (TOBs). Expansion of the Joint Operation Center. Development of police-specific mission plan; force (re)configuration; Political assessment, mapping of humanitarian needs; mapping of human rights situation; and development of civilian-specific mission plan.

46. **Phase 1: Reorientation, realignment, co-location**

- a. Proposed Timeline: 1 Jan 2025 – 1 Jul 2025.
- b. **Intent:** Alignment of all troops (AU, SNAF) to Mission disposition to enable continued delivery of security and support to ongoing operations. SSF to co-locate with AU troops in line with agreed framework.
- c. **Scheme of manoeuvre:** Commencement of Mission. Alignment of troops to meet strategic and operational plan established in Phase 0. Integration of any additional capabilities required to meet Mission tasks. Transfer agreed locations to SSF. Joint approach to operations including all SNAF, AU and international partner activities, including CIMIC, Information Operations, understanding of Human Rights Situation. Offensive Operations continue against Al-Shabaab in line with Campaign Plan. SNAF generate additional troops to meet operational troop deficit.
- d. **Focus of Effort:** Reconfiguration of troops to start of the Mission. Securing of key installations and critical infrastructure; monitoring of human rights situation and IHL, IHRL violations; conduct of in-mission trainings and sensitization activities; conduct of trainings for Mission personnel on IHL, IHRL and conduct and discipline.

47. **Phase 2a: Securing and Stabilizing**

- a. **Proposed Timeline:** 1 Jul 2025 – 31 Dec 2027
- b. **Intent:** Secure core locations including critical infrastructure and key population centres.
- c. **Scheme of manoeuvre:** AU maintain presence in **MOB/TOB** locations to protect population centres, critical infrastructure and key installations. Forces conduct framework patrolling to provide security and enable development of governance structures and humanitarian organisations to function. Sectors to have Quick Reaction Forces.
- d. **Focus of Effort:** Provision of security in AoR. safeguarding of UN and AU personnel, installations and equipment; support to humanitarian operations; conduct of training for AU including on matters of IHL and IHRL compliance. Coordination of humanitarian assistance and CIMIC activities.

48. **Phase 2b: Supporting Offensive operations**

- a. **Proposed Timeline:** 1 Jul 2025 – 31 Dec 2027
- b. **Intent:** Support SNAF in conducting Offensive Operations
- c. **Scheme of manoeuvre:** AU provide capabilities to support the implementation of the campaign plan in its Operations against Al-Shabaab.
- d. **Focus of Effort:** Provision of Offensive Capabilities in support of SNAF Offensive Operations against Al-Shabaab. conduct of training for SPF and support police generation

49. **Phase 2c: Supporting Sustainment Activity**

a. **Proposed Timeline:** 1 Jul 2025 – 31 Dec 2027

b. **Intent:** Enable Sustainment activity throughout AOR.

c. **Scheme of manoeuvre:** Maintenance of key MSRs throughout AOR to support sustainment activity for AU, UNSOS and SNAF, including by road and air. As SNAF Sustainment Command conducts joint operations, AU forces shall mentor and advise SNAF progressively as outlined in SSDP.

d. **Focus of Effort:** Provision of sustainment and support to logistics convoys and mentoring of SNAF sustainment capability. Scaling down of units' strength and footprint to meet the new tactical situations.

50. **Phase 3: Transition and drawdown**

a. **Proposed Timeline:** 1 Jan 2028 – 31 Dec 2028

b. **Intent:** Continue to handover of security responsibilities to SSF for eventual drawdown and withdrawal of AU

c. **Scheme of manoeuvre:** MSRs secured and maintained to contribute to an enabling environment to allow efficient and gradual withdrawal of assets. Continued offensive activity by SNAF supported by a reduced number of AU capabilities as the SNAF develops enhanced capabilities as outlined in SSDP.

d. **Focus of Effort:** Successful handover of MOB/TOBSs and security responsibilities to SSF and the withdrawal of AU mission personnel.

51. **Phase 4: Exit**

a. **Proposed Timeline:** 1 Jan 2029 – 31 Dec 2029

b. **Intent:** Extraction of all remaining personnel and the close down of the Mission.

c. **Scheme of manoeuvre:** All personnel, equipment and materiel repatriated; agreed assets handed over to FGS; Post Mission Report including Lessons Learned to be completed.

d. **Focus of Effort:** Close down of Mission.

XVI. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION ARCHITECTURE

52. Political. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) mandate includes the Mission functioning authority vested with the Chairperson of the AU Commission who will appoint a Special Representative (SRCC). The SRCC will also act as Head of Mission. The SRCC assumes the responsibility for implementing the Mission's mandate and exercising the AU Commission's authority to lead and manage the Mission. The SRCC reports through the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS) to the Chairperson.

53. Strategic. The Strategic level command is the overall responsibility of the Chairperson, with the assistance of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS), who shall ensure strategic planning, oversight, management, monitoring and reporting to ensure that all the Mission's Components meet the requirements and deliver the expected benchmarks and objectives. The Chairperson will also appoint a Force Commander and a Police Commissioner, whose functions will be laid out in specific directives.

54. Operational

a. The Mission military component will operate under the central command, control and authority of a Force Commander. To facilitate effective operations, all TCCs formally agree for their respective contingents and units to be under the effective Operational Command (OPCOM) of the Force Commander.

b. The Mission police component, comprised of Formed Police Units (FPUs) and Individual Police Officers (IPOs), will operate under a central command and control and authority of a Police Commissioner.

55. Tactical. There will be a Sector commander with staff officers who will have tactical control (TACON) over the forces assigned to that sector. The Force Commander shall facilitate the conduct of joint/simultaneous/coordinated combat operations, when necessary and within the Mission's capabilities. Sector forces shall comprise of contingent pledged from the contributing countries with the contingent commander having Tactical Command (TACOM).

XVII. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION

56. The Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) of the AU Commission shall bolster the strategic management of the Mission through a dedicated Integrated Strategic Team within PAPS, under the supervision of the Director of the Conflict Management Directorate.

57. The Integrated Strategic Team should also ensure leveraging of capacities from other specialized missions/offices of the AU. This is to ensure comprehensive strategic support and effective coordination in relation to the Mission. The Integrated Strategic Team will regularly monitor and review the implementation of the Mission mandate and tasks, as well as facilitate strategic and operational management and decision-making efforts and required actions for due consideration by the Commissioner PAPS and the AU PSC, as the case may be.

58. Relatedly, PAPS Department shall collaborate with other relevant AUC departments to ensure AU policies, processes and procedures are better aligned to fit the specific requirements of the context of the Mission to enable expedited processes and procedures to facilitate effective mission management and support by the Commission, especially for human resources and recruitment, financial management and procurement.

XVIII. OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES

59. The Mission leadership shall be responsible for operational management based on AU policies and procedures and in line with the requirements of AU PSOs' operational realities. This will ensure expedited processes and procedures to facilitate requirements such as recruitment (prioritizing local human-resources to take advantage of local knowledge and skills), administration, budget and financing, compliance and accountability, procurement. These should be done considering the context of Somalia and the reality on the ground which necessitates alignment of current AU policies and procedures to fit the Mission's unique context and realities in Somalia as well as operational exigencies in a complex and volatile environment.

60. Within this context, daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual reports of the Mission should be reviewed by the integrated strategic headquarters team to enable effective monitoring, reporting and management as well as compliance and accountability of the Mission in line with AU and Mission processes, procedures and relevant staff regulations and rules.

XIX KEY PERFORMANCE BENCHMARKS FOR THE MISSION

61. Draft benchmarks developed and will need to be agreed by all parties during the detailed mission planning in order to hold them accountable for their role within the Mission and the implementation of SSDP. These benchmarks will be assessed on a six-monthly basis between the FGS and AU.

XX. MISSION SUPPORT

62. The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is currently in the final stages of drawing down its operations in Somalia. By 31 December 2024, ATMIS is expected to complete the process and officially exit Somalia. The transition from ATMIS to the new Mission requires meticulous planning to prevent security and support gaps that could jeopardize the gains achieved by both ATMIS and previously AMISOM. To address this, a concept of logistics support will be developed. This concept will:

- a. Provide clarity on the support model needed for the Mission, taking into consideration the crucial role the UN will continue to play in providing logistics support, and outline the various categories of support required to sustain operations;
 - b. Be delineated the different phases, drawing lessons from the various support models;
 - c. Ensure an integrated logistic system, to deliver flexible support across the new Mission's Sectors, in support of Mission components and SSF operations.
63. The concept of logistics support will be developed at the mission planning phase.

XXI. MISSION-SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS

64. The following will be the main mission-specific documents:
- a. Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA);
 - b. Statements of Unit Requirements (SUR);
 - c. Memoranda of Understanding AU-TCCs/PCCs;
 - d. Tripartite Memoranda of Understanding AU-UN-TCCs/PCCs;
 - e. Tripartite Letter of Assist (LOA) AU-UN-TCCs/PCCs;
 - f. Rules of Engagement (RoE);
 - g. Directives on the Use of Force (DUF);
 - h. Mission-specific Protection of Civilians Strategy.

ANNEX A FOR DRAFT BENCHMARKS.

Draft Benchmarks – for refinement during detailed planning Phase

Ser	Benchmark Area	Indicators	Projected timeline
1.01	Transition to follow on mission (Phase 0)	Drawdown to adjusted footprint	Number of FOBS transitioned.
		Transition of responsibility for security of existing FOBS from ATMIS to SNA/LSF/closed.	FOB transition ahead of new mission.
		SSF assume responsibility for cleared areas	
2.01	Joint Strategic and Operational Planning between AU Follow on Forces, SSF and International Partners.	<p>Joint planning to establish a long term (5 year) campaign plan for the defeat of AS within the duration of FoF mission, and subsequent identification of operational priorities.</p> <p>Annual analysis of campaign plan and realignment of operational priorities to meet changing security environment.</p> <p>Phase 0 planning for the reduction to 23/27 FOBS agreed by all parties with reasonable and achievable time period agreed.</p>	<p>Established within first 6 months of the new mission.</p> <p>AU-FGS-UN to perform bi- annual analysis of planning.</p> <p>Coherent planning occurs and all parties in agreement over timescales (including UNSOS and IPs).</p>

3.01	AU Follow on Forces support to ongoing offensive operations – capabilities	Command and Control relationships and mechanisms agreed and accepted by all parties.	Number/percentage of joint operations including number of times support requested and delivered within agreed parameters of readiness.
Helicopter support available (utility).		Availability / hours used.	
Helicopter support available (attack).		Availability / hours used.	
ISR support to Operations.		Availability / hours used.	
National Air QRF and Mobile Sector QRFs.		Readiness timelines / availability / Operations supported.	
Light Attack Aircraft. MEU.		Availability / hours used / Operations supported. Ability to support ongoing operations.	
AS degraded and lacking FoM within Somalia.		80% reduction in activity by FMS or Sector.	
Reduction in threat from AS (and other insurgent organisations) with reduced threat from attacks.		80% reduction in number of attacks / number of casualties / fatalities etc.	
Freedom of movement for SSF along all MSRs.		80% reduction in attacks and IED incidents on MSRs between Mogadishu and state capitals.	
Developed and effective strategic communications strategy to counter al Shabab narrative.		Level of activity by SNAF / response / population reached / measurement of perception of AU FOF and SNAF by general population.	
AU FoF able to deploy to conduct independent offensive action against AS in AOR through agreed command and control mechanisms.		All operations following agreed command and control, and in agreed Area of Responsibility.	

4.01	Supporting activities to address threat posed by AS	Financial disruption plan finalized and implemented to impact AS financing.	Disruption plan implemented - level of impact upon AS financing.
		National Stabilization strategy implemented including advancement of flexible community recovery and engagement package to support operations.	Progress of stabilization strategy.
		Implementation of National Stabilization Strategy including advancement of flexible community recovery and engagement package.	Implementation against benchmarks within NSS.
		Defector Rehabilitation Programme revised and implemented to increase defection from AS.	Number of defectors from AS, integration of AS back into society.
		Implementation of roadmap to human rights compliant and inclusive amnesty law for former AS fighters.	Roadmap implemented and approved by international humanitarian organisations.
5.01	Development of SNAF and SPF	In line with Defense White Paper development of SNAF.	Against structure of Now/next/later.

	SNAF - Development of Somali owned and run training facilities able to self-generate personnel without recourse to external partners.	In line with SSDP and subsequent SNAF TRADOC direction.
	SNAF Equipped AS per Defense White Paper capable of defending all major population centres and MSRs.	Strength of SNAF (percentage personnel against strength of 35,000)
	One-time policy developed for rightsizing and Pensions and Gratuity Bill passed.	Clearance of Non-operational troops from SNAF.
	SNAF restructured to Defense White Paper structure with establishment of 4x new commands in accordance with FGS intent.	Establishment and providing outputs at FOC AS articulate in benchmarks for each command.
	Co-location of SSF with AU FoF to ensure smooth transition at the end state.	Transition of security responsibilities to SSF fully achieved
	Governance structures established and functioning.	Executive committees, steering groups and working groups all functioning effectively with all attending.
	Effective logistical capability developed.	SNAF have ability to supply to distribution points in all sectors.
	All activity in compliance with IHL and IHRL with civilians protected and risks mitigated.	Effective training delivered to all personnel and monitored by independent partners with no breaches recorded.

		Somali Police Force developed in line with SSDP and White Paper.	Number of trained, equipped and effective police.
		Somali Police Force able to discharge security responsibilities in areas assigned to control.	National Coverage by SPF.
6.01	Enhanced Logistic Support and Sustainment for SNAF and AU follow on Forces	Mechanisms in place for support of entire AU FoF Mission and SNAF.	Support provided through UNSOS/AU/SNAF J4 - number of stores supplied. All natures delivered including WAM.
		Ability to support humanitarian requirements in times of disaster.	Level of flexibility and redundancy within logistic capability to support in emergency situation.
7.01	Post mission management	Deliberate handover or repatriation of workforce, equipment and infrastructure.	Mission successfully completed and extracted from Somalia, or to subsequent national agreements.