MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

AMANI AFRICA

Media and Research Services

June, 2025

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JUNE 2025

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THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In June, Tanzania chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC initially planned to convene six substantive agenda items. However, after the revision of the program of work (PoW), it held five sessions with six agenda items. Four of the agenda items were on thematic issues, while two focused on country-specific situations. All five sessions were held at the ambassadorial level.

The PoW was revised twice during the month. The first revision saw the postponement of the session on the briefing on the 'status of the implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and other relevant AU instruments related to continental defence and security,' which was scheduled for 17 June. This revision also saw the postponement of the meeting on the 'update on the implementation of the PSC and East African Community/Southern African Development Community (EAC/SADC) decisions on the situation in Eastern DRC,' which was planned for 25 June. In addition, a meeting was added to the monthly program on 25 June, focusing on the 'presentation of the Peace Fund CRF and Programmatic Activities for 2026.' Another agenda item was later added on 19 June to adopt the 'Report of the PSC Field Mission to the Republic of Guinea, conducted from 30 to 31 May 2025.' The second revision, on the other hand, led to the ambassadorial-level meeting, which was introduced and scheduled for 25 June to be held at the Committee of Experts (CoE) level. Subsequently, the ambassadors met two days later, on 27 June, to consider the outcome of the deliberations from the CoE meeting of 25 June.



Apart from the 4 June and 27 June sessions, whose outcomes were summary records, each of the remaining four sessions adopted communiqués as outcome documents, and one report of the field mission. On average, the outcome documents were published within seven days of their respective sessions.

PROLIFERATION AND TRAFFICKING IN SALW POSE A CONTINUING THREAT, THE PSC

Council held its first session of the month on 4 June, as its 1281st session, focusing on the 'Synergy between the Global Framework Ammunition (GFA) Management and the Regional Arms and Ammunition Control Instruments.'[1]

1 *Apart from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, those who addressed the PSC included Parfait Onanga-Anyanda, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN and Head of the UN Office to the AU, the Executive Secretary of the Regional Centre on Small Arms in*

The meeting was held within the framework of a study titled 'Synergies Between African Regional Instruments and Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management', which explored the alignment between the four key African regional instruments and the fifteen objectives of the GFA. The study and the PSC meeting were undertaken in view of and to prepare for the meeting of States Parties to the Global Framework Ammunition expected to be held at the UN Headquarters in New York in 2027.

From the Summary Record of this 1281st meeting, the PSC commended the AU Commission for preparing the study and urged Member States to provide their inputs in order to facilitate the presentation of the key findings and recommendations to the Africa Group in New York for informing the preparatory meeting of State Parties to the Global Framework on Ammunition scheduled to take place during the course of the month.

The GFA, as captured in the edition of Insights on the PSC of this session, consists of voluntary political commitments.



Figure 1: PSC 1281st meeting, 4 June 2025.
(Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

The Council, noting the ongoing illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), expressed concern over the continued threat posed by such proliferation and circulation to national, regional, continental and international peace and security and its contribution to armed conflicts and criminality, with severe impacts on Africa's stability and development. Recognising issues arising from challenges to ammunition management, the Council emphasised the imperative for Member States to enhance preparedness for emergencies in order to prevent and manage incidents related to ammunition accidents, thefts or seizures.

Regional arms and ammunition control instruments

- The Bamako Declaration of 2000.
- The SADC Protocol of 2001.
- The Nairobi Protocol of 2004.
- The ECOWAS Convention of 2006.
- The Central African Convention/Kinshasa Convention, adopted in 2010 by ECCAS.
- The AU Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW.

In addition, underlining the responsibility of states in arms control and stockpile management, Council emphasised the establishment of national mechanisms, encompassing legal frameworks, administrative procedures and institutional structures, for the control and administrative management of arms and light weapons. Furthermore, Council urged Member States, within the bounds of their national legal frameworks, to update existing instruments or develop additional protocols on weapons and related equipment. This is said to target not only the illicit trade of SALW, but also the emergence of new weapons that are increasingly shaping contemporary conflicts.

Highlighting the importance of incorporating a gender dimension into all stages of weapons and equipment

the Great Lakes Region, Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) and representatives of ECCAS, ECOWAS and SADC.

management, the Council requested the AU Commission to develop an AU Operational Guidance Note on mainstreaming gender consideration in arms and ammunition management.

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC:

- Urged member states to provide their inputs in order to facilitate the presentation of the key findings and recommendations to the Africa Group in New York for informing the preparatory meeting of State Parties to the Global Framework on Ammunition scheduled to take place during the course of the month; and

- Requested the AU Commission to develop an AU Operational Guidance Note to support Member States and RECs/RMs in mainstreaming gender considerations into arms and ammunition management.

PSC ENDORSES REVISED LAKE CHAD BASIN STABILISATION STRATEGY, AS IT DECLARES BOKO HARAM AS 'EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY'

Previous PSC Decisions	Insights on the PSC
816th session, 5 December 2018	Briefing on the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
1207th session, 8 April 2024	Briefing on the situation in the Lake Chad Basin, MNJTF operations and Regional Stabilisation Strategy implementation
1254th session, 13 January 2025	Consideration of the Report of AUC Chairperson on the activities of MNJTF and mandate renewal of the Force

Drawn from Insights on the PSC 9 June 2025.

The PSC, at its 1282nd session held on 10 June, considered the Revised Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR) and received an update on the operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in countering the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). [2]

2 The Council took note of the opening remarks by Innocent Shiyo, PSC Chair for June 2025; the introductory statement by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security; and the presentations by the LCBC representative and the MNJTF Deputy Force Commander.

Figure 2: PSC 1282nd meeting, 10 June 2025. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

The meeting concluded with a communiqué, which formally endorsed the revised five-year Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Resilience and Recovery (RS-SRR) of Boko Haram Affected Areas of the LCB. The revised five-year stabilisation strategy represents a strategic shift from a purely military response to a more comprehensive approach.

The Council noted that Boko Haram 'remains an existential threat to peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin and the wider region.' In this respect, it recognised the increasing use of new weapons technology by Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in the region, including drones. To this end, it emphasized the need for the mission to have 'modern drone detection and jamming equipment, combat and reconnaissance drones, combat boats, armoured vehicles, and demining equipment'. The Force's continued lack of such modern military assets, including anti-drone systems and counter-Improvised Electronic Devices (IED) capabilities, undermines its operational effectiveness and leaves it vulnerable to attacks. As noted in the edition of Insights on the PSC prepared for the session, IEDs 'along main supply routes, accounted for approximately 60% of MNJTF casualties in 2024'. This threat may increase further as the terror groups transition from using drones for reconnaissance to combat.

The continued importance of the AU support to the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the activities of the MNJTF, including through the 'Crisis Reserve Facility of the AU Peace Fund', and for supplying additional equipment from the 'Continental Logistics Base', was emphasised. In this respect, the PSC also took note and endorsed the recommendation for recognising Maiduguri Teaching Hospital to provide medical services to MNJTF troops, a positive development in terms of addressing troop welfare.

Consistent with previous PSC sessions, the Council called for 'sustainable, predictable, and adequate funding' of the MNJTF.

As captured in our pre-session analysis of the edition of Insights on the PSC dedicated to the session, the combination of Niger's exit and the influx of militants and weapons from the Sahel and ISIS networks in North Africa threatens to erode the gains achieved under the MNJTF. It was therefore reasonable to expect the Council to seek clarity on the implications of the withdrawal and explore measures to mitigate its impact. However, the PSC did not go further than expressing 'deep concern,' and adopt measures for addressing the gaps that may arise from Niger's departure or its broader political ramifications.

Considering the proclamation by Chad that it may also withdraw from the MNJTF, Niger's departure reflects broader questions around shared political vision. The deliberations and the outcome of the PSC session do not show that the PSC gave this issue the level of attention it deserves.

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to enhance its support to and collaboration

with the LCBC in the implementation of the revised Five-Year RS-SRR;

- Requested the AU Commission to continue supporting the MNJTF in its operations to consolidate and sustain the gains made thus far against the Boko Haram terrorist group; and
- Requested the AU Commission and international partners to support MNJTF with modern knowledge and equipment relevant to Boko Haram Terrorists' current capabilities, including modern drone detection and jamming equipment, combat and reconnaissance drones, combat boats, armoured vehicles, and demining equipment.

PSC WARNS OF 'A FULL-SCALE WAR' IN SOUTH SUDAN AND URGES THE AU COMMISSION CHAIRPERSON TO MAINTAIN SUSTAINED ENGAGEMENT

On 12 June, the PSC convened its 1283rd session to receive an updated briefing on the situation in South Sudan.[3] The session came following high-level visits to South Sudan, a) by the Panel of the Wise, which the PSC had called for during its 1265th and 1270th sessions, and b) by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).



Figure 3: PSC 1283rd meeting, 12 June 2025. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

The PSC went further from its earlier pronouncements on the situation in South Sudan in its assessment of the gravity of the situation in South Sudan. Expressing 'deep concern' over the deteriorating political and security situation, in the communiqué it adopted, the Council warned about 'the potential of a full-scale war, in violation of the Ceasefire Agreement, thus reversing all the gains registered thus far... in the implementation of the R-ARCSS.' The PSC called for an '*immediate cessation of hostilities*' between the South Sudan Peoples' Defence Forces (SSPDF), Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), the White Army, and all other affiliated groups. It reiterated that the R-ARCSS remains the only viable framework for achieving sustainable peace in South Sudan. As it calls on the parties to 'agree to mediation and pursue genuine dialogue', the PSC expressed 'deep concern over the continued detention of Riek Machar Teny, First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan' and 'the dismissal and detention of SPLM-IO officials from

3 The session was briefed by the representatives from South Africa (as the Chair of the AU high-level ad hoc Committee on South Sudan (C5)); South Sudan (as the concerned state); IGAD secretariat; the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC); and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

the Revitalised National Government of Unity (R-TGoNU), in blatant violation of the R-ARCSS.' It thus reiterated its call 'for their immediate and unconditional release and reinstatement.' The PSC considered these measures to be necessary not only 'to de-escalate the ongoing political tension' but also 'to prevent the total collapse of the R-ARCSS.'

Cognisant of how the erosion of trust and the ensuing breakdown of relations between the leaders of the signatories of the R-ARCSS, the Council urged 'the pursuit of dialogue aimed at restoring mutual trust and confidence.' Reaffirming the R-ARCSS as the only viable framework for lasting peace in South Sudan and calling for the signatory parties to use peaceful and legal means to resolve their differences and refrain from undermining the agreement and the coalition under RTGoNU, PSC urged them to respect the provisions of the R-ARCSS and desist from undermining peace.

While the PSC was right in calling for an investigation of all violations of the R-ARCSS and warning that peace spoilers will be held accountable, it did not outline the modalities of how these steps need to be followed up. However, in terms of further steps for addressing the deteriorating situation, the PSC envisaged the deployment of sustained diplomatic efforts. First, it encouraged 'the Panel of the Wise to continue its engagement and mediation efforts with all actors, and the parties to the R-ARCSS. Second, it also encouraged the AU Commission Chairperson 'to sustain engagements with President Salva Kiir and regional leaders to foster inclusive dialogue, facilitate the release of political detainees and support the full implementation of 'R-ARCSS.'

The PSC's call on the AU Commission Chairperson to sustain engagement with 'regional leaders' is particularly notable considering the influence that Uganda, in particular, has in South Sudan. Indeed, it would be difficult for any mediation effort for de-escalating tension and restoring full commitment of the parties to the R-ARCSS to be effective without harnessing and relying on Kampala's support and leverage.

The threat that the recent fighting and continuing risk of violence pose to the protection of civilians also received the attention of the PSC. Condemning 'violence against civilians, particularly women and children,' which, in its view, constitutes violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, the PSC called for 'an immediate end to indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure.' It also urged South Sudanese authorities to investigate and hold perpetrators accountable 'while taking immediate action to ensure protection of civilians.'

The other issue that was the centre of discussion during the session, as it had been in recent years, was the implementation of the R-ARCSS. In this respect, apart from encouraging the parties to the Tumaini Initiative and those yet to join 'to reach a timely consensus for an inclusive peace process,' the PSC first called on 'the RTGoNU to expediate the deployment of the Necessary United Forces...facilitate the civic and political space for inclusive engagement.' Second, it encouraged 'the South Sudanese parties to commit implementing all outstanding transitional tasks, such as security sector reform including undertaking the second phase of the unification of forces, and the harmonisation of the command structure with a national character under one commander in chief.' Third, it urged the RTGoNU to mobilise resources for the three institutions critical to the implementation of transitional tasks, critical to the holding of elections: the National Elections Commission

(NEC), the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) and the Political Parties Council (PPC).

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission, working in collaboration with the IGAD Secretariat, to further strengthen political engagement and mediation support to the South Sudan peace process, including through the continued use of the Panel of the Wise:
- Encouraged the Trilateral Mechanism to work with the RTGoNU 'to reactivate the Government-Trilateral Joint Task Force (JTF) and facilitate the implementation of pending R-ARCSS provisions, including constitution making and electoral processes:' and
- Reiterated its call on 'the RTGoNU to continue working with the AU Commission – Office of the Legal Counsel (OLC) - to develop the Guidelines for the Establishment of the Hybrid Court of South Sudan and the modalities for the truth, reconciliation, compensation and reparation processes.'

PSC LOOKING FORWARD TO THE END OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD IN GUINEA IN DECEMBER 2025, DESPITE A LACK OF INCLUSIVITY AND POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 25(4) OF THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE

The PSC's 1284th session, held on 19 June, was dedicated to considering the report of its field mission to Guinea, conducted from 30 to 31 May 2025.[4]

As indicated in the field mission report, the main objective was to engage with Guinean transitional authorities and other key stakeholders to assess the status of the transition process since the military takeover of power on 5 September 2021. During the visit, the PSC delegation held consultations mainly with Guinean transition authorities. However, a major limitation of the mission was the absence of engagement with a wide range of stakeholders, such as civil society organisations, political parties, religious leaders, and international development partners. In this regard, the report itself acknowledges that 'several core issues such as the status of inclusivity in the transition process, civic freedoms, human rights protections, and the effectiveness of public outreach and participation mechanisms remained insufficiently explored.' The mission also did not include a meeting with the interim President, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya.

Figure 4: PSC field mission to Guinea, 30 - 31 May 2025 (Source: X @AUC_PAPS).

4 *Harold Bundu Saffa, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the AU and PSC Chairperson for May 2025 delivered presentation of the Report of the PSC Field Mission to Guinea.*

The session adopted the field mission report and its recommendations, most of which were reflected in the communiqué issued as an outcome document. A key highlight of both the report and the communiqué was the status of Guinea's political transition. The report noted that a draft constitution has been finalised and submitted to the Office of the President, who came to power by the barrel of the gun.[5] A constitutional referendum is scheduled for 21 September 2025, followed by general elections (presidential and legislative) expected in December 2025, which would mark the end of Guinea's over four-year transitional period.

One interesting point of discussion between the PSC delegation and Guinean authorities during the field mission was the latter's request for the AU to consider lifting sanctions on Guinea, particularly after the constitutional referendum this September. The authorities argued that lifting the sanctions would facilitate the country's re-engagement with the international community, enabling access to vital partnerships necessary for socio-economic development. However, in both the communiqué and the report, the PSC alluded that the conduct of presidential elections in December 2025, not the constitutional referendum, would mark the formal end of the transition period.

While the PSC urges Guinean transition authorities to continue honoring their commitment to complete the transition by December 2025, it is noteworthy that the Council has once again failed to remind the authorities of their obligation to refrain from participating in the upcoming elections, as stipulated under Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). This provision explicitly prohibits coup perpetrators from contesting elections organised to end transitional periods.

This omission is neither new nor incidental. It reflects a troubling pattern in which the PSC continues to sideline a core component of its anti-coup framework. A similar situation unfolded in Gabon, where the Council failed to communicate AU's rule of non-eligibility of those who participated in the military seizure of power stipulated under Article 25(4) during its field mission in September 2024, as well as in the communiqué of its 1241st session, which adopted the mission's report.

Although it remains unclear whether Mamady Doumbouya intends to run in Guinea's upcoming elections, current trends indicate that the PSC may lift the country's suspension as long as elections are held in December—even if Doumbouya participates and wins, in clear violation of Article 25(4) of ACDEG.

Recent patterns suggest a shift in PSC's priorities, with growing emphasis on bringing countries suspended due to military coups back to the AU fold, even at the cost of compromising its own anti-coup norms. Gabon's return to the AU fold following the election of the coup leader as President is illustrative of this current trend. The prevailing sentiment within the Council appears to be adopting a more flexible and pragmatic approach, thereby departing from AU's declared zero tolerance to coups. (For further analysis, see the 10 April 2025 edition of Amani Africa's *Ideas Indaba*.)

The PSC further requested the AU Commission to identify and provide the necessary technical and financial support for Guinea's transition process, particularly

5 The draft introduces a single seven-year presidential term renewable once and does not bar Doumbouya from contesting in the upcoming election, despite the transitional charter's prohibition on transition authorities running in the next polls.

the constitutional referendum, the general elections, and efforts to strengthen the judicial system. At the same time, the PSC underscored the imperative of ensuring inclusivity in Guinea's political process—a critical concern given the widespread dissolution and suspension of political parties. As noted in the field mission's report, the transitional authorities evaluated over 200 political parties, resulting in the dissolution of about 80% for allegedly failing to comply with the country's legislative requirements, as part of the so-called 'refoundation of the state.' While the authorities described this move as a necessary 'clean-up' of Guinea's political landscape, it is legitimately criticised, not only as an undue restriction on freedom of association but also as a strategy to sideline key political actors from the upcoming elections and pave the way for Doumbouya's presidential bid.

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC:

- Urged Guinean transition authorities to continue honouring the commitments made toward the completion of the transition period by December 2025;
- Requested the AU Commission to engage the Transition Authorities of Guinea to identify areas of support and provide the needed technical and financial support to Guinea, in particular for the organisation of the referendum for the new constitution, as well as the strengthening of judicial systems and preparation for the general elections; and
- Highlighted the importance of inclusivity in Guinea's political process by involving a broader range of stakeholders, including women and youth, to promote national ownership of the transition, build trust, and incorporate diverse perspectives on governance, human rights, and reconciliation issues.

THE PSC-ACHPR SESSION MISSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD ON THE OUTCOMES OF PREVIOUS SESSIONS

On 19 June, the PSC convened its 1284th session, which was dedicated to an annual consultative meeting between the PSC and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR). The outcome of the meeting was adopted as a Communiqué.

This consultation, which was meant to happen annually, came after a hiatus of about four years. During the session, the ACHPR provided an update about its work, including the activities being undertaken in relation to human rights issues in conflict situations on the agenda of the PSC. This includes the implementation of the decision of the PSC mandating the ACHPR, in collaboration with the AU Commission, to investigate human rights violations in the ongoing civil war in Sudan. The Chairperson of the Commission also highlighted challenges facing the ACHPR, including cooperation from member states, non-implementation of decisions and lack of funds. Member states, on their part, raised issues of concern regarding the implementation of the mandate of the Commission, including with specific reference to individual countries.

As opposed to the outcomes of some of the previous consultations, the contents of the communiqué are couched in general terms, with few operational details. It appears that the consultation did not involve extensive engagement on practical steps in enhancing a close working relationship and operationalising modalities identified for giving effect to Article 19 of the PSC protocol in earlier consultations. Notably,

the Communiqué does not build upon the modalities for cooperation identified during the inaugural consultative meeting held at the PSC's 866th session in 2019. These include undertaking joint field visits to conflict-affected or post-conflict countries, ensuring that the PSC communicates decisions with human rights implications to the ACHPR, and enabling regular ACHPR briefings to the PSC on the human rights dimension of situations on its agenda. These modalities remain highly relevant, particularly for strengthening early warning and preventive diplomacy as well as for mainstreaming human rights in conflict management and resolution, as well as Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) processes. Yet, the 1284th session outcome fails to provide operational details on implementing these measures. For instance, there is no mention of planned joint missions or follow-up on past engagements. Additionally, the communique also made no reference to any ongoing investigation of human rights violations in a specific situation by the ACHPR.

Similarly, the PSC and the ACHPR also missed an opportunity to explicitly acknowledge the need for interaction with the relevant ACHPR's special mechanisms—such as Special Rapporteurs and Focal Points—which are vital tools for targeted interventions and monitoring. Despite such explicit lack of recognition of the role of ACHPR's subsidiary bodies, the specific reference to the work of the ACHPR on transitional justice is indicative of how to draw on the work of the special mechanisms.

While the emphasis on mainstreaming human rights is a reiteration of decisions on previous consultations, worthy of note from the communiqué is the request for the ACHPR to pay attention to women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, migrants, internally displaced persons and refugees. The PSC's call for respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) by belligerents is an essential reaffirmation of applicable legal norms in conflict settings. It is thus noteworthy that the PSC acknowledged the ACHPR's role and encouraged continued technical and advisory assistance to Member States in implementing the AU Continental Transitional Justice Policy.

The PSC's emphasis on a rights-based approach to peace and security, including mainstreaming human rights across the conflict cycle from early warning to post-conflict reconstruction, is a significant strength that aligns with contemporary peacebuilding paradigms. Although this emphasis is significant, the PSC missed the chance to explicitly mandate the ACHPR to contribute proactive human rights analyses to Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) or to recommend early engagement in states showing signs of rights deterioration. As highlighted in our analysis of the 1019th session, the recurrence of unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) often stems from longstanding civil and political rights violations. A robust PSC–ACHPR cooperation that flags such patterns early could be pivotal in preventing escalation into full-blown crises.

Additionally, the Communiqué's recognition of the indivisibility and mutual reinforcement of economic, social and political rights reflects a commendable awareness of the multidimensional nature of peace and development. This holistic approach aligns with contemporary peacebuilding paradigms, which emphasise that sustainable peace cannot be achieved without addressing structural inequalities, ensuring inclusive governance and protecting fundamental human rights. By acknowledging that these rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing,

the PSC affirms a progressive understanding of the underlying conditions necessary for stability and resilience in African societies. Addressing the root causes of violent conflict, including deprivation, inequality and discrimination, is another aspect that is rightly underscored in the outcome document adopted by the session. This thematic focus echoes its previous decision, insistence on comprehensive, inclusive approaches that tackle structural drivers of conflict and promote sustainable peace.

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up

The PSC requested the ACHPR:

- To pay particular attention to the human rights of vulnerable groups that are subject to additional risks in conflict settings, such as women, children, the elderly, persons living with disabilities, migrants, internally displaced persons, and refugees; and
- To work in collaboration with the AU Commission to identify alternative funding mechanisms in order to provide adequate financial resources to enable the ACHPR to more effectively discharge its mandate, in particular, for fact-finding missions and for effective human rights interventions on the continent.

PSC ENDORSES AN ADDITIONAL $10 MILLION FOR AUSSOM IN 2025, RAISING AU'S TOTAL FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO $20 MILLION

On 27 June, at its 1285th session, the PSC met virtually to consider the Peace Fund Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) and the programmatic activities for 2026.[6] The meeting was initially scheduled for 25 June at the ambassadorial level but was instead held at the level of the CoE. As a result, the agenda was first discussed by the CoE. During the 1285th session, the PSC agreed to regularise the consideration of this agenda item by dedicating a meeting every March at both the expert and ambassadorial levels and by including it in the Annual Indicative Programme of the PSC. The outcome of the session was kept in the form of a Summary Record.

The main focus and key outcome of the discussion is the allocation of additional funding to the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The Council endorsed the AU Commission's proposal to allocate an additional $10 million to AUSSOM for 2025. The Council further directed engagement on this matter with the Chairpersons of the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) and PRC Sub-Committee on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters (GSCBFAM).

It is recalled that the 46th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, held in February 2025, approved a dedicated allocation of $10 million from the CRF to support AUSSOM. This decision is in line with the recommendations of the PSC at its 1236th session, which called for utilising part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investments, including the CRF, to make a substantial contribution to financing AUSSOM. The additional $10 million allocation raises the Peace Fund's total contribution to AUSSOM in 2025 to $20 million.

6 During the session, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and Fina John Mselle, Tanzanian Expert and Chairperson of the CoE for June 2025, delivered presentations on the Peace Fund CRF and Programmatic Activities for 2026, and on the outcomes of the CoE Meeting on the same topics, respectively.

This significant increase in AU funding comes in response to the mission's mounting financial stress and the major setback it experienced when the UN Security Council declined to authorise the use of Resolution 2719 (2023) as a funding modality. The absence of a reliable source of funding has raised serious concerns about not only AUSSOM's effectiveness but also its continuity.

The estimated budget for AUSSOM from July 2025 to June 2026 stands at $166.5 million, based on the current troop reimbursement rate of $828. The mission urgently requires $92 million in cash to cover liabilities incurred between January and June 2025, in addition to $93.9 million in arrears owed to Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) from 2022 to 2024.

By allocating an additional $10 million to AUSSOM from its limited resources—despite AU troops paying in life and limb to uphold peace and security in Somalia, a global public good—the AU shows willingness to walk the talk of never to let Somalia down..

The Council further signalled its intention to make greater use of the Peace Fund's accrued interest by directing the Peace Fund Secretariat to utilise these proceeds—including previously unused interest—rather than reinvesting them, in order to address the continent's pressing peace and security challenges.

Since its operationalisation in 2023, the Peace Fund has disbursed a total of $19 million through the CRF to support various peace and security activities. The CRF allocation has significantly increased from $7 million in 2023 to $20 million (including the latest additional $10 million endorsed for AUSSOM) in 2025.



CRF allocations 2023-2025

The operationalisation of the Peace Fund is not limited to CRF. Since 2024, the Fund has also allocated from the interest accrued to the endowment resources to the Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Peace Fund Pilot Projects. In this context, the 44th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, held in February 2024, approved $5 million—drawn from Peace Fund interest proceeds—for the 2024 PAPS Pilot Projects, which focus on mediation and preventive diplomacy, institutional capacity building, and peace support operations. A similar amount was approved by the 46th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council for the 2025 PAPS Peace Fund Pilot Projects.

During this session, the Council also noted the challenges in the implementation of the programmatic activities, particularly in 2024. The implementation rate of the Peace Fund Pilot Projects Budget for 2024 is reportedly 32%, while the CRF budget execution for the same year stands at 30%—a notable decline compared to the 98.2% execution rate achieved for the CRF in 2023. It appears that progress has been made in this area in 2025. The Council further requested the Commission to submit reports and an implementation matrix on the activities implemented through the Peace Fund Bank interest.

Meanwhile, the Peace Fund's utilisation has so far been limited to accrued interest, and it remains unclear when and how the AU intends to draw on the endowment itself, which has now surpassed $400 million.

OTHER PSC ACTIVITIES DURING THE MONTH

In addition to the substantive meetings of the PSC, the CoE convened on 25 June for discussion on the 'Presentation of the Peace Fund CRF and Programmatic Activities for 2026.'

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