

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

AMANI AFRICA

Media and Research Services

October 2024

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1 Consultation with the Secretary General of the League of Arab States. 	2 The Peace and Security Development nexus in Africa: Bridging Gaps between Policy and Practice 	3 Mission to Port Sudan 	4	5
6	7	8	9 Consideration of the report of the Mission to Cairo and Port-Sudan 	10	11 CoE Consultations with the UNPBC and UNSC Experts	12
13 CoE Consultations with the UNPBC and UNSC Experts	14	15 7th Joint Consultative Meeting with the UNPBC 	16 Public lecture at Yale University	17 9th Informal Consultations between AUPSC / UNSC 18th AUPSC-UNSC Consultative Meeting 	18	19
20	21	22 • Joint Meeting between PSC, and PRC Budget (GSCB/FAM) on Financing PSOs and PSC Activities. • Briefing by the Peace Fund Secretariat 	23 Consideration of the AU Commission Report on Combating Terrorism in the Continent 	24	25	26
27 Update on the Situation in Somalia, and Post-ATMIS arrangements 	28 Briefing by the ICRC on the Humanitarian Situation in Africa 	29 Consultations on the Common African Position vis-à-vis climate change, peace and security 	30	31 Briefing on the Women, Peace and Security interlinkage 		

OCTOBER
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

MONTH AT A GLANCE.....1

PSC CALLS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AU POLICY
FRAMEWORK ON THE PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS.....2

LIFTING OF THE SUSPENSION OF SUDAN FROM THE AU TOOK CENTRE STAGE
DURING CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT ON PSC FIELD MISSION TO SUDAN.....3

AU PSC AND UNPBC UNDERSCORED THE NEED FOR A STRUCTURED
TRANSITION FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING TO SUSTAIN PEACE.....6

AU PSC AND UNSC CONVEN ANNUAL JOINT CONSULTATIVE MEETING, COMMIT TO
INTERACTIVE DIALOGUE AND ADDRESS KEY CONFLICT SITUATIONS IN AFRICA.....7

FINANCING THE NEW AU MISSION IN SOMALIA TOOK CENTRE STAGE
IN PSC’S SESSION WITH GSCBFAM AND THE PEACE FUND.....10

PSC MARCHING ON THE SAME GROUND FOLLOWING ITS
CONSIDERATION OF THE AU REPORT ON TERRORISM IN AFRICA.....11

PSC REQUESTS THE AU COMMISSION CHAIRPERSON TO USE PRVENTIVE
DIPLOMACY TO THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA.....12

PSC URGES PROTECTION OF IDP AND REFUGEE CAMPS
FROM EXPLOITATION BY ARMED GROUPS.....14

PSC SEEKS FURTHER ENGAGEMENT WITH STAKEHOLDERS ON DEVELOPING
THE COMMON AFRICA POSITION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, PEACE AND SECURITY.....15

PSC URGES MEMBER STATES TO ENSURE INCREASED
PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN ALL STAGES OF PSOS.....16

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES.....17

MONTH AT A GLANCE


In October 2024, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) undertook its activities under the chairship of the Arab Republic of Egypt. The PSC's initial Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) envisaged eight substantive sessions with nine agenda items to be covered for the month. While the PPoW underwent two revisions, this mainly led to shifts in planned sessions and activity dates.

In addition to the substantive session, the Council held a series of consultative meetings during the month, which included a consultative meeting with the League of Arab States; the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the UN Peace Building Commission (UNPBC). The Council also undertook a field visit to Cairo and Port Sudan.

Among the nine agenda items scheduled to take place, seven focused on thematic issues, while the remaining two agenda items covered country-specific situations in the Horn of Africa, focusing on the situation in Somalia and post-ATMIS and the situation in Sudan as a follow-up to the field mission to Port Sudan. Beyond the dedicated attention it received during the 1238th session, Somalia/post-ATMIS was also a major focus of the 1236th session of the PSC.

Activities of the AU Peace and Security Council and its Subsidiary Bodies

October 2024



The sessions held during the month resulted in seven communiqués and one press statement. The Council also produced a joint communiqué based on the consultative meeting it held with the UNSC and a joint statement following the consultative meeting with the UNPBC. The session with two agenda items, the Joint Meeting between PSC, and PRC Budget (GSCBFAM), on Financing PSOs and PSC Activities, and the AU Peace Fund were convened as one meeting resulting in one communiqué for both agenda items.

PSC CALLS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AU POLICY FRAMEWORK ON THE PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

On 2 October, the PSC convened its 1234th session on the theme 'Peace, Security and Development Nexus in Africa: Bridging the Gaps Between Policy and Practice' held at the ambassadorial level, in Cairo, Egypt.¹

In the [communiqué](#) it adopted, the major highlights centre around three areas. The first area, which was the focus of the session, concerns the issue of how to pursue and operationalise the peace, security and development nexus in policy and practice. In this respect, the PSC underscored 'the importance of practical steps for bridging the gaps between policy and practice in the application of the Nexus Approach.' Yet, the PSC, beyond tasking the AU Commission to develop a matrix of implementation of decisions on nexus, did not clarify how this needs to be achieved. In apparent recognition of the need for enriching policy thinking on translating the nexus issue from abstract policy commitment to operational policy tools and processes, as discussed in [the edition of Insights on the PSC](#) dedicated to this session, the PSC further underscored 'the need for a comprehensive conceptualisation of the Nexus Approach'. To this end, it emphasised the importance of 'developing an AU Policy Framework on the

¹ *Speakers of the session included: Mohamed Gad, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for October 2024; Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department; Ahmed Abdel-Latif, Director General of the Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCCA) and Executive Director of the Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development; and a recorded statement by Nardos Bekele-Thomas, Chief Executive Officer of the AU Development Agency (AUDA/NEPAD)*

Peace, Security and Development nexus.'

In terms of substantive articulation, the closest the PSC came to give content to the issue of nexus is in the emphasis it placed 'on holistically addressing the underlying structural root causes, drivers and enablers of violent conflicts in Africa, while stressing the importance of state-building and the development of strong, resilient state institutions as critical foundations for sustainable peace and development.' Echoing our pre-session analysis referenced above, the PSC also underscored the need for mainstreaming the development dimension in the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to silence the guns in Africa. It also puts emphasis on coordination between peace and security policy actors and development policy actors within and beyond the AU as well as on leveraging the role of entities such as the African Development Bank. It also expressed recognition of the importance of the humanitarian dimension, although unlike previous sessions the humanitarian component is dropped from part of the caption on the nexus.

The second area addressed in the session pertains to the role of the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy. It thus envisaged the 'convening of a forum to exchange lessons learned from the African Continent on the various mechanisms and institutions designed to advance PCRDR efforts' such as the African Solidarity Initiative! The PSC further encouraged 'the implementation of the Revised AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRDR) Policy Framework to provide the necessary support to all Member States, in particular those in political transition and emerging from conflict.' It also urged the AU, 'through the PCRDR Centre, in collaboration with the Member States concerned, and RECs/RMs for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,

and AU Centers of Excellence to consistently identify, initiate and promote simultaneously long-term, medium-term and short-term integrated post-conflict stabilisation, reconstruction and development initiatives.'

The third area largely involves profiling the initiatives linked to the subject that individual countries are championing. In this respect, echoing the AU Assembly Decision ([Assembly/AU/Dec. 817\(XXXV\)](#)), the PSC urged the AU Commission 'to implement the conclusions of the inaugural AU Policy Conference on Promoting the Peace, Security and Development Nexus in Africa – The Promise of Regional Integration, adopted in Tangier, Morocco in October 2022.' The PSC also commended the Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development noting that the conclusions of the 4th Aswan Forum 'contribute towards advancing the peace-security-development nexus as well as peacebuilding and sustainable development in Africa.'



The 1234th PSC meeting.
(Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

Key actionable decisions

The PSC

- tasked the AU Commission to develop a matrix on the status of implementation of all AU decisions and declarations on peace, security and development nexus since 1991, including those that specifically address PCRD.

- requested the AU Commission Chairperson to regularly submit an annual report to the PSC on the measures taken to further enhance the collaboration and coordination among the different departments within the AUC and AU Specialised Agencies.

The PSC also emphasised the need for

- developing an AU Policy Framework on the Peace, Security and Development nexus
- convening a forum to exchange lessons learned from the African Continent on the various mechanisms and institutions designed to advance PCRD efforts.

LIFTING OF THE SUSPENSION OF SUDAN FROM THE AU TOOK CENTRE STAGE DURING CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT ON PSC FIELD MISSION TO SUDAN

On 9 October, the AU PSC convened its 1235th to discuss the report from its recent field mission to Egypt and Sudan. While the session addressed both visits to Port Sudan and Cairo, the mission to Port Sudan² was the

² During their visit to Port Sudan, the Council engaged with several key stakeholders, including Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces; H.E. Mohammed Al Fatih Tayfour, Attorney-General and Head of the National Commission of Inquiry into Crimes and Violations of National and International Humanitarian Law; General Ibrahim Gaber, a member of the Transitional Sovereign Council and Chairman of the Supreme Committee for Humanitarian Affairs; H.E. Suliman Arcua Minnawi (Minni Minawi), the Darfur Regional Governor; as well as representatives from civil society organisations, religious leaders, and political parties. It is important to note that the Council did not engage with representatives from the Rapid Support

primary focus of the Council's [communiqué](#). This visit was prompted by a previous [communiqué](#) requesting the Council to undertake a field mission to Port Sudan, which has not been followed up due to security concerns.



AU PSC Field Mission to Port Sudan
(Source: AUC_PAPS)

Previous PSC Decisions:

- 1149 Session [PSC/PR/COMM.1149 (2023)]: PSC agreed to undertake a Field Mission to Sudan

The visit provided an opportunity for the Council to engage with some Sudanese stakeholders including the Sovereign Council of the Transitional Government. The exchanges during the meeting with the head of The Sovereign Council and Commander of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), Abdel Fattah Al Burhan touched on SAF's version of what the ongoing war is about including the responsibility that the Rapid Support Force (RSF) bear for the war and SAF's expectations on how to achieve peace as well as the issue of the relationship between the Sudanese authorities and the AU. Burhan reportedly expressed strong rejection of the PSC's decision to suspend Sudan and called for the lifting of Sudan's suspension from the AU.

During the PSC's session on the report of the field mission, the issue of lifting the suspension of Sudan became a centre of contention. The discussion revealed the fault lines on how to deal with countries that

Force (RSF) during its visit.


experienced military seizure of power. The entertainment of the request for the lifting of suspension only of Sudan also posed for some member states not just policy dilemma from legitimate concerns of favouritism and double standards but also the risk of further division at the regional level with the other suspended states particularly in the Sahel for whom no consideration is being given for lifting of the suspension.

The PSC was unable to reach at a consensus. While five member states of the PSC reportedly supported the request for the lifting of the suspension, others were not convinced that conditions for the lifting of the suspension were in place under the prevailing conditions in Sudan. The session was briefly adjourned to allow consultations. In the end, unable to agree on lifting the suspension, Sudan's suspension was upheld by default. However, the PSC in its communiqué took note of the concern by the Sudanese authorities and stakeholders over the suspension of Sudan from participating in the activities of the AU and its Organs and envisaged 'the need for more engagement and communications by the AU with Sudanese authorities.' It also welcomed 'the willingness expressed towards the formation of a civilian-led transitional government.'

Based on Burhan's account of the war and vision to end it, the PSC underscored the importance of the two proposals of 'i) ending the war and the establishment of consensually agreed cantonment areas/ assembly points; and ii) Resumption of the democratic/ civilian-led political transition.' The PSC did urge all Sudanese stakeholders to cooperate with the PSC Presidential Ad Hoc Committee (C-5) on Sudan, which was scheduled to convene its inaugural meeting on 23 October 2024, in Entebbe, Uganda. However, it was ultimately cancelled due to delayed responses from the delegations of both warring parties and some of the

member states. It was learned that the lack of congruence in the approach to the conflict involving some of the members of the C-5 might have contributed to the lack of progress in convening the Committee.

The AU PSC C-5 consists of member states representing the five regions: Nigeria representing West Africa, Uganda representing East Africa, Angola representing Southern Africa, Equatorial Guinea representing Central Africa, and Egypt representing North Africa.



In terms of the peace process, the PSC, apart from reiterating its pre-existing position that there is no military solution to the conflict in Sudan, expressed its continued support for the centrality of all Sudanese inclusive dialogue and the need for the AU to continue facilitating intra-Sudanese dialogue while coordinating with other efforts. It also requested the AU Commission Chairperson to support the PSC Presidential Ad Hoc Committee, the High-Level Panel, IGAD and its neighbouring countries, as well as other relevant stakeholders, in the implementation of the AU Roadmap for the resolution of the Crisis in Sudan. Omitted from the communiqué in terms of the role the AU assigned to itself regarding the situation in Sudan is the coordination of various efforts under the now dormant expanded coordination mechanism.

On the humanitarian front, the PSC outlined a more extensive course of action. It urged 'the warring parties to implement

the agreements reached in the Jeddah Declaration of 11 May 2023 relating to humanitarian access and protection of civilians and withdrawal from civilian homes and buildings.' It welcomed the Sudanese government's decision to open the Adre border crossing from Chad to North Darfur and its commitment to allow humanitarian aid through Dabbah. The Council also demanded that the RSF lift the siege on the city of El Fasher and that the two parties facilitate the opening up of more humanitarian corridors and for an indefinite period to allow safe and unhindered assistance. Additionally, the Council made a specific request for the AUC chairperson to mobilise humanitarian assistance through relevant AU institutions, including the African Union CDC, the AU Development Agency (AUDA), the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Refugees and submit a report on the same within 10-day time.

Key Actionable Decision Requiring Follow-Up:

The PSC

- requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to reopen the AU Liaison Office to Sudan, in Port Sudan, with minimum staffing, taking into consideration the prevailing security situation, to inter alia, allow AU's engagements with the stakeholders in Sudan at all levels, as well as to provide technical support to Sudan, including through the use of the AU Peace Fund and its Crisis Reserve Facility and requests that any attendant budgetary implications, if any, should be addressed through re-allocation;
- requested the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration of 11 May 2023 and the two parties facilitate the opening up of more humanitarian corridors and for an indefinite period to allow the safe and

unhindered assistance.

- requested the AU Commission to continue facilitating the intra-Sudanese dialogue.

AU PSC AND UNPBC UNDERSCORED THE NEED FOR A STRUCTURED TRANSITION FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING TO SUSTAIN PEACE

On 15 October 2024, the PSC and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) held their second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting in New York under the co-chairship of the PSC chairperson for October 2024, Mohammed Gad, and the UNPBC Chair Sérgio França Danese.³

As indicated in Amani Africa's [insight on the session](#), a core focus for this year's engagement was the transition from peacekeeping operations to peacebuilding. In light of the untimely drawdowns and departure of missions in the continent like that of MINUSMA, UNITMAS, MONUSCO, and SAMIM, the two bodies recognised the major challenges facing the missions' drawdowns including complex handover processes, short timelines of drawdown and financial cliffs. The [joint statement](#) issued following the session 'underscored the crucial role of structured transitions from peacekeeping missions to peacebuilding in preventing the relapse of conflicts and sustaining peace in Africa'. The PSC and PBC emphasised the importance of initiating early collaborations

³ Statements were delivered by Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of UNOAU; Elizabeth Spehar, ASG for Peacebuilding Support, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Alhaji Sarjoh Bah, Director of Conflict Management, AUC.

with national authorities and integrating peacebuilding strategies throughout a mission's cycle to ensure a smooth transition. The importance of early planning and coordination with multiple stakeholders before the drawdowns was also stressed. They further highlighted the cruciality of ensuring sustainable, predictable and adequate financing for AU-led PSOs in line with Resolution 2719 and underscored the need for innovative funding mechanisms.



AU PSC & UNPBC Convening
(Source: @UNPeacebuilding1)

On the Lake Chad Basin, welcoming the progress made in the implementation of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy, Recovery and Resilience, the PSC and the PBC called for partners to 'step in with funding, technical and logistics supports for the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the MNJTF Troops Contributing Countries, to enable the full and effective implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Lake Chad Basin.'

In view of the 2025 review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, the AU is invited to prepare its contributions as it did for the 2020 Review. In terms of working methods, the two sides agreed for their annual consultative meetings to be preceded by at least one preparatory meeting at the level of the committee of experts.

AU PSC AND UNSC CONVEN ANNUAL JOINT CONSULTATIVE MEETING, COMMIT TO INTERACTIVE DIALOGUE AND ADDRESS KEY CONFLICT SITUATIONS IN AFRICA


On 17 October, the PSC and UNSC held their 9th annual joint informal seminar ahead of the 18th annual consultative meeting. Hosted in a retreat format in Tarrytown, New York, at Switzerland’s proposal as UNSC President, the seminar was intended to facilitate a more interactive dialogue between the two Councils. However, limited prior coordination led the PSC to follow its usual format, delivering scripted statements rather than engaging in free-flowing exchanges.

This year’s seminar was particularly packed, with six agenda items on youth, peace and security, women, peace and security, children affected by armed conflict, climate change and Resolution 2719. This year’s agenda items thus became twice as many as the previous year, as shown in the infographic below. The outcomes of the seminar are incorporated into the [joint communiqué](#) of the 18th annual consultative meeting.



Two key outcomes related to **working methods** emerged. First, both Councils expressed support for institutionalising the interactive nature of the seminar, including the retreat format, to deepen dialogue, cooperation, and trust. Second, they welcomed PSC’s proposal to explore an informal follow-up mechanism for implementing previous joint communiqués. This aligns with Amani Africa’s [recommendation](#) that both Councils strengthen follow-up and increase the reference value of joint communiqués by systematically reviewing the previous year’s communiqué at the start of each annual consultative meeting. This approach aims to ensure continuity, evaluate the productivity of deliberations, and identify areas for improvement.

The 18th annual joint consultative meeting addressed four key agenda items: the situations in Sudan, Somalia and post-ATMIS security arrangements, the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, and the Great Lakes region with a focus on the DRC and CAR.



On the situation in **Sudan**, the Councils addressed the reported atrocities, including widespread sexual and gender-based violence, by threatening parties to the conflict with targeted UNSC sanctions, in line with paragraph 3(c) of Resolution 1591 (2005). This resolution established a sanctions regime for Sudan that includes asset freezes, travel bans, and an arms embargo. Similarly, the Council warned states that facilitate arms transfers to Darfur, in violation of the

embargo, that they too could face targeted sanctions. This stance is significant, as increasing external interference is not only intensifying the violence and worsening civilian impacts but also complicating diplomatic efforts for a peaceful resolution. Yet, the formulation is an admission that the arms embargo is being breached and not enforced. Concerning the multiplicity of initiatives, the Councils affirmed the central roles of the AU and IGAD, urging other actors to ensure that their peace initiatives are complementary to, and coordinated with, the AU's roadmap for conflict resolution.

On the **Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions**, the Councils emphasised the need for a multidimensional approach to tackle the structural root causes of insecurity—an approach aimed at addressing the conditions that enable terrorism to spread in these areas. **However, the meeting failed to provide any concrete course of action on how to stem the tide of terrorist attacks in the Sahel.**

A notable element in the joint communiqué is the language employed in relation to the termination of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali (Algiers Accord). Sources indicate that framing these issues was one of the sticky points during the negotiation over the joint communiqué. The Councils 'acknowledged' the end of MINUSMA, adding a footnote that the PSC 'made reference to the AU Assembly decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.868 (XXXVII)] of February 2024.' This language underscores a divergence between the PSC and certain UNSC members, notably Russia, on how MINUSMA's withdrawal should be interpreted. The AU Assembly, in its 37th session, expressed 'concern' over MINUSMA's departure and the Malian transitional authorities' denunciation of the 2015 Peace

and Reconciliation Agreement established by the Algiers process. On the latter, the joint communiqué merely 'noted' its cancellation, rather than expressing explicit concerns as the AU Assembly did. Reports also suggest that Algeria and Russia diverged on this issue, with Algeria advocating for a specific mention of the Agreement as a viable instrument for peace in Mali while Russia opposed it.

Regarding **Somalia and the post-ATMIS security arrangement**, the Councils reaffirmed strong support for Somalia's unity, territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty, emphasising this stance with a standalone, **bolded** paragraph. It does not appear that there was a detailed discussion between the two Councils about the follow-on mission, likely on account of the report by the UN Secretary-General that was due for submission in mid-November. While the communiqué referenced this upcoming report, it also noted the need for diversified support from international partners to ensure the mission's financial stability, signalling the lack of consensus on the use of Resolution 2719.

In addressing the **Great Lakes region**, the communiqué focused on the situations in eastern DRC and CAR. The situation in **eastern DRC** was another flashpoint in the negotiation of the joint communiqué. Reportedly, the centre of contention was the proposed formulation on condemnation of foreign military support for the M23 and the reference to the illegal exploitation of natural resources and its use for fuelling conflicts in eastern DRC. Apparently, the opposition to such references was from one of the A3 members of the UNSC. With support from other UNSC members and those from the PSC, the communiqué expressed strong condemnation of foreign military support for the M23 rebel group, demanding an immediate end to such support and the

withdrawal of any external forces from the entire Congolese territory. Various reports indicate that Rwanda has provided support to M23, a claim Kigali often denies. This language is notably stronger than that used in prior PSC communiqués and previous PSC-UNSC joint communiqués on the issue, likely Signifying the elevation of DRC's voice owing to its membership in the PSC.

The Councils also condemned support by military forces—an implicit reference to the Congolese National Army (FARDC)—for specific armed groups, particularly the FDLR (an ethnic Hutu armed group whose members include those who participated in the 1994 genocide and operating in eastern DRC), and similarly called for an immediate end to such assistance.

The Council welcomed the Luanda-brokered ceasefire agreement between DRC and Rwanda in July, specifically noting provisions on operationalising an FDLR neutralisation plan and developing a disengagement plan.


Regarding the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the Councils condemned all attacks against the mission, urged all parties to ensure its freedom of movement, and stressed the need for a 'gradual, responsible, and sustainable' withdrawal plan. They also welcomed the authorisation of logistical and operational support from MONUSCO to the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) under UNSC Resolution 2746 (2024).

An additional notable element in the communiqué was its recognition of the link between illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources, arms trafficking, and the implication in fueling conflict in eastern DRC. In condemning the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the Councils called on all actors to cease these practices—a stipulation likely to be contentious for some

of DRC's neighbouring countries.

In the case of **CAR**, a key highlight is the upcoming local elections, set for April next year—the first in over three decades but repeatedly postponed, primarily due to resource limitations. The Councils urged the international community to support the government in mobilising the necessary resources, as this remains a significant factor behind the delays.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the communiqué is its discussion around the illegal exploitation of CAR's natural resources, particularly the suspension of diamond exports under the Kimberley Process—a multi-stakeholder trade regime established in 2003 to prevent the trade of conflict diamonds. The Councils noted that 'suspension of diamond export sanctions can facilitate the development of CAR.' The sanction currently limits exports from production areas in the eastern and parts of the southwestern regions.



Map: Kimberley Process green zones, and gold and diamond deposits in CAR
(Source: Alexandre Jaillon and Guillaume de Brier)
<https://shorturl.at/jIS4q>)

The CAR government has been actively campaigning for the suspension of the sanction, including by President Faustin Touadéra during the 79th session of the UN General Assembly in September. While the Kimberley Process—not the UNSC—imposed the sanction, the Councils appear supportive of its suspension, particularly as the Kimberley Process is set to review the

sanctions following the monitoring team's visit to CAR in September 2024.

FINANCING THE NEW AU MISSION IN SOMALIA TOOK CENTRE STAGE IN PSC'S SESSION WITH GSCBFAM AND THE PEACE FUND

On 22 October the AU PSC convened its 1236th session with the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial, and Administrative Matters (GSCBFAM). Although this session was aimed at strengthening the PSC and sub-committees' working relations and budgetary planning around peace and security initiatives undertaken by the Union, the session predominantly focused on identifying and mobilising resources for the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) peace support operations. In this regard, the [outcome document](#) from the session stressed the UNSC Resolution 2719 as an opportunity for funding the new mission in Somalia, strongly recommending the consideration of UNSC Res 2719 for application towards AUSSOM. Endorsing the recent engagement between the AU Commission Chairperson and the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of the roadmap for the operationalising of the UNSC Res 2719 and requested both the AU and the UN to ensure 'all necessary mechanisms to facilitate expeditious implementation of resolution 2719 and other relevant funding mechanisms to support AU PSOs'.

Most notably, the PSC called for financing of AUSSOM using part of 'interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment, including the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) to substantially contribute to the financing of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission

in Somalia (AUSSOM)'. This is a significant development. Previously, part of the CRF was used in relation to ATMIS but only as a gap filling measure and at a small scale. This is the first time that that the PSC calls for the use of the interest from the Peace Fund not limited to the CRF to support the AU mission and do so at 'substantial' scale.

The Council also commended the Peace Fund Secretariat for their efforts in diversifying the pool of funding for AU peace and security activities. In this regard, it welcomed the outreach of the Secretariat to the private sector, particularly, the convening of a high-level pledging event during the Mid-Year Coordination Meeting in Accra, Ghana, in July 2024. In the spirit of diversification of funding, the Council during its convening also highlighted the need for 'developing innovative financial mechanisms to allow for the AU to respond to emerging security threats.' However, the sourcing of funds from such new sources requires a strategy for engagement with such sources and modalities of accounting for the use of funds from such sources.

Key Decisions Requiring Follow-up

The PSC

- recommended the use of part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment, including the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), to substantially contribute to the financing of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), in line with the AU Consensus Paper on Predictable, Adequate and Sustainable Financing of Peace and Security Activities in Africa; and
- requested the AU and UN to put in place all necessary mechanisms to facilitate expeditious implementation of resolution 2719 and other relevant funding mechanisms to support AU PSOs, in order to ensure sustainable and predictable funding

of AU-led PSOs;

PSC MARCHING ON THE SAME GROUND FOLLOWING ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE AU REPORT ON TERRORISM IN AFRICA

On 23 October, the PSC convened for its 1237th session to discuss the AU Commission Report on Combating Terrorism. During this session, the Council received presentations from key stakeholders within the Union regarding counter-terrorism and violent extremism in the region.⁴

A major focus of the meeting was the [Report](#) from the AU Commission on Combating Terrorism. This document, organised into several sections, updated the Council on the current state of terrorism and violent extremism in the region since the previous reporting period. Notably, the report indicated a 20% increase in terrorist attacks during the first quarter of 2024 compared to the previous year. This surge has also led to a 33.3% rise in casualties. The report identified the Sahel, West, East, and Central Africa as the most affected regions, with Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Cameroon being the most severely affected nations. Together, these countries accounted for over 79% of all attacks and 80% of terrorism-related deaths.⁵ In light of these statistics and trends, the outcome [document adopted](#) by the Council expressed its concern over the alarming

⁴ AU PSC received a statement from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria to the AU as the AU Champion on the Fight Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism; the presentations by the African Union Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC); the Executive Secretary of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA); and by the Representative of the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL)

⁵ PSC/PR/CN.1237 (2024)

rise and spread of terrorism and violent extremism, condemning terrorism in all forms, as has been customary in previous sessions. The PSC's communiqué also reflected on the recommendations from the Chairperson's report, emphasising the need to strengthen the AU Counter-Terrorism architecture. These include the operationalisation of the AU PSC Sub-Committee on Counter-terrorism to provide real-time monitoring and interventions against terrorism. Accordingly, the Council requested the Commission to report back by the first quarter of 2025 on the steps taken to implement and operationalisation the PSC Sub-Committee on counter-terrorism. Other mechanisms that have been revitalised since the Malabo summit such as the Djibouti and Nouakchott Processes as well as the regional centres for counter-terrorism efforts including the upgraded of the Nigerian National Counter-Terrorism Centre to the West African Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre in April 2024 and the AU Plan of Action for the prevention and combating terrorism were highlighted as pathways for intelligence sharing, cross-border cooperation and collective security approaches to combating terrorism.

Much of the elements in the communiqué remain a rehash of existing pronouncements. As such, the [communiqué](#) on the deliberation of the PSC on the Chairperson's report put emphasis on the implementation of existing decisions. In two instances, it called on the AU Commission to report back to the PSC on identified areas within a specified period of time. The only instance the PSC may be considered as adopting a new element is when it directed the AU PCRDC Centre 'to develop programmes to support the building of strong and resilient state institutions in counter-terrorism and post-territorial defeat efforts.'

Overall, **the communiqué has a security-centric focus from the AU instruments and institutions on which it is anchored as specified in paragraph 2 to the instruments referenced in its various parts noted above.** Even then, apart from urging reinforcement of existing arrangements in countering terrorism such as the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin, it failed to establish any tool for helping the most affected countries such as those in the Sahel respond to the raging fire of terrorism posing existential threat to the affected countries.

The communiqué that the PSC adopted makes a note to non-security-centric dimensions of responding to the threat of terrorism in a few instances. One such instance is when the PSC encouraged ‘States to adopt multifaceted and comprehensive ‘whole of society and whole of government’ approaches that incorporate and strengthen coherence between political, security, investment, growth and development activities in support of governance, sustainable economic growth, and poverty eradication in addressing the root causes and structural drivers of terrorism’. The other instance was when it directed the AU PCRDC Centre to develop programs to build strong and resilient state institutions.

Key Actionable Decision Requiring Follow-Up:

The PSC

- requested the Commission to report back to Council, by the first quarter of 2025, on the steps taken to establish and operationalise the PSC Sub-Committee on Counter-terrorism;
- requested the AU Commission to continue supporting the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), including by mobilising additional funding to enhance its fight against terrorists in the Lake Chad Region and other regional deployments, as well as strengthening intelli-

gence-sharing mechanisms on the continent;

- requested the AU Commission to submit a detailed progress report on the implementation of the Malabo and Abuja Declarations to the Council also by the first quarter of 2025 for consideration;
- directed the AU PCRDC Centre, working in collaboration with the AUCTC, to develop programmes to support the building of strong and resilient state institutions in counter-terrorism and post-territorial defeat efforts.

PSC REQUESTS THE AU COMMISSION CHAIRPERSON TO USE PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY TO THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA

On 28 October, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) convened its 1238th session to receive an update from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) regarding the Situation in Somalia and the Post-ATMIS Arrangements with a Specific Focus on the Preservation of State Institutions.⁶

The session discussed the transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM, which has become a major regional flashpoint, thereby featuring on the agenda of not just the PSC but the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the League of Arab States as well.

The session came during the delayed third-phase drawdown of ATMIS forces, expected to be completed by August 2024. In light of this, the PSC highlighted the need for a detailed timeline for the finalisation of

⁶ *Sivuyile Bam Deputy Head of ATMIS provided update and Abdullahi Warfa, Permanent Representative of Somalia to the AU delivered a statement.*

the Mission Planning for AUSSOM and a liquidation plan for ATMIS. The UN Secretariat and the AU Commission were expected to report to the UNSC by 15 November on proposals for mission design, funding strategies, benchmarks and exit strategy in consultation with the FGS and international stakeholders.

A major sticking point that is impeding progress in finalising the transition from ATMIS and the mission design of AUSSOM is the composition of troop contribution, most notably the dispute over Ethiopia's participation in AUSSOM. PSC member states were unable to agree on the request of Somalia through a note verbale sent to the PSC for Somalia to choose the countries that would contribute troops to AUSSOM. In a Press Statement⁷ issued a day before the submission of the note verbale to the PSC, the FGS had asserted its right to choose troop partner nations to contribute to the new mission in alignment with Somalia's national interest and the preservation of its sovereignty.

The adoption of the [communiqué](#) during the session was delayed as member states broke the silence procedure over the formulation on the determination of the troop contribution. In the end, the PSC sought to adopt a middle ground between AU's lead role and that of the host state. Thus, when it was finally adopted, the [communiqué](#) directed 'the AU to undertake consultations with member states that have expressed readiness to contribute troops to AUSSOM.' At the same time, the Council underlined that troop partner nations that contribute to the mission 'must respect the principles of the mission, including respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Somalia as stipulated in the [CONOPS](#) adopted by the Council in the

⁷ *Press Statement: Somalia's Stance on Sovereignty and Ethiopia's Role in the African Union Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM), 23 October 2024*

[communiqué](#) of its 1225th session.' The session and the communiqué also acknowledged the FGS President's diplomatic efforts in engaging with neighbouring and Troop/Police Contributing Countries of ATMIS in the planning process for the AUSSOM, from which Ethiopia was notably absent.

Recognising the adverse impact of the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia over the memorandum of understanding Ethiopia signed with Somaliland on the AU mission, the PSC requested the AU Commission Chairperson, in close cooperation with stakeholders to 'use all available preventive diplomacy tools to urgently find an amicable/peaceful solution to the differences between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia based on respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia'.

On the other pressing issue of securing adequate, predictable and sustainable funding, the PSC continues to push for a dedicated funding mechanism through UN-assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) to address longstanding financial challenges facing the AU mission. The session also welcomed the decision from the joint meeting of the PSC with the PRC (GSABM) Sub-Committee on General Supervision, Administrative and Budget Matters to use part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund Investment and the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) to substantially contribute to the financing of AUSSOM.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-Up:

The PSC

- requested the AU Commission to continue extensive engagements with the UN, European Union, strategic partners

and potential new donors to ensure adequate, predictable, sustainable funding and other forms of support for the AUSSOM;

- requested the Chairperson of the African Union Commission working in close cooperation with the relevant Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), and other stakeholders, to use all available preventive diplomacy tools to urgently find an amicable/peaceful solution to the differences between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia based on respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia; and
- directed the AU Commission to undertake consultation with Member States that have expressed readiness to contribute troops to AUSSOM.

PSC URGES PROTECTION OF IDP AND REFUGEE CAMPS FROM EXPLOITATION BY ARMED GROUPS

The PSC convened for its 1239th meeting on 29 October for the briefing by the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) on the Humanitarian Situation in Africa, which came in as a customary session, institutionalised by the PSC in its 99th meeting held on 9 November 2007.

Commending the efforts of ICRC and all other humanitarian aid agencies for their continued effort to address the humanitarian situation in the continent, the PSC underlined the importance of ‘enhancing collaboration among all humanitarian actors, including with the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Agency.’ The Council also considered the plight of the vulnerable in the society, specifically the IDPs

and refugees and in this regard, urged AU Member States ‘to protect refugee and IDP camps and take measures to protect them from any exploitation by armed groups.’

In terms of funding, the PSC underscored the need for ‘expediting the implementation of the Declaration [Ext/Assembly/AU/Decl. (XV)] adopted by the 15th Extraordinary AU Humanitarian Summit and Pledging Conference, held on 27 May 2022 in Malabo⁸ and relatedly, reiterated its request for the AU Commission, in consultation with the UN humanitarian agencies and other key partners, to ‘redouble resource mobilisation efforts, in order to ensure the provision of adequate, and flexible funding for humanitarian action in Africa.’

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC

- requested the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive study, identifying the financial shortfalls and making concrete and practicable proposals on how to address the financial challenges for meeting Africa’s humanitarian needs.
- reiterated the request for the AU Commission to lead efforts for an all-Africa mega pledge modelled after the post-Malabo 10-year Plan of Action in the following areas: Addressing Humanitarian challenges in Africa; Climate Change, Disasters, and Forced Displacement in Africa; Food Security and Nutrition in Humanitarian Situations in Africa; Health Challenges in Humanitarian Space in Africa; Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development for Refugees and Internally Displaced

⁸ *Malabo Declaration of the 15th Extraordinary African Union Humanitarian Summit And Pledging Conference*, https://papsrepositary.africa-union.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/1725/Declaration%20on%20Humanitarian%20_%20E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Persons in Africa; and Resource Mobilisation and Financing for Humanitarian Action in Africa.

- to develop systems for the collection and analysis of statistics aimed at the registration of refugees in camps in Africa with a view to improving decision-making and the effectiveness of humanitarian action on the Continent.

PSC SEEKS FURTHER ENGAGEMENT WITH STAKEHOLDERS ON DEVELOPING THE COMMON AFRICA POSITION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, PEACE AND SECURITY

PSC's 1240th session convened on 30 October was dedicated to the consultations on the Common African Position vis-à-vis climate change, peace and security.⁹ This session followed a three-day consultation organised by the AU Commission on the development of the Common African Position on Climate Change, Peace and Security (CAP-CPS) from 27 to 29 August 2024 in Nairobi, Kenya. According to the [statement](#) released on the conclusion of the consultations, a draft of the CAP-CPS was finalised and is now set to be shared with AU Member States and submitted to the PSC for further consideration and potential adoption. While welcoming the consultation, the PSC highlighted that the development of the CAP should be 'data-driven and informed by contributions of Member States and African institutions.'

⁹ Representatives from the Cairo Centre for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping Training in Africa (CCCPA), and the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) were the speakers during the session.

This session, which appears to be conducted without sharing the draft CAP-CPS, was more of creating a shared understanding among PSC members of the complex climate change, peace and security nexus in Africa and gathering input for refining the CAP. The session underscored the need to utilise the CAP-CPS as an informed framework for ensuring effective collaboration between AU, regional stakeholders, national governments, and international partners.

One of the areas the session indicated for further consideration while developing the CAP is the view of sustainable cross-border transhumance, taking into account the requirements of biodiversity conservation, the fight against the adverse effects of climate change as well as those of peace and security. Instead of hastening to adopt the CAP-CPS, the PSC appears to take the position that further engagements are held with various stakeholders, notably the private sector, CSOs, research and technology innovation communities, African Group of Negotiators and Climate national focal points to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

The [communiqué](#) adopted as an outcome of the session elaborated substantive elements. It highlighted the importance of inclusive decision-making that involves marginalised groups, investing in risk prevention and resilience, improving access to climate finance through concessional instruments, building absorption capacity, rapidly operationalising the loss and damage fund, and ensuring that climate responses are conflict- and security-sensitive. It also stressed the need to mainstream peacebuilding efforts and strengthen cross-sectoral coordination among diverse stakeholders. However, the PSC did not provide the Commission with a specific timeline for submitting the draft CAP-CPS for review and adoption.

PSC URGES MEMBER STATES TO ENSURE INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN ALL STAGES OF PSOS

The last session of the PSC for the month of October was an open session on Women, Peace and Security, held virtually on 31 October 2024, in the context of the 24th anniversary of the UN Resolution 1325 (2000).¹⁰ The session that marked the 1242nd meeting of the PSC aimed to take stock of the progress and gaps in promoting women's participation in peace support operations.

Previously in its 986th session held in March 2021, the PSC had emphasised the need for women's participation in all AU-led Peace Support Operations. However, despite positive policy initiatives and the proven importance of women's participation in peacekeeping operations, women's participation and leadership in PSOs remain low. In light of this, the session underscored the pivotal role of women in promoting peace and security and the need to have effective representations of women at national, regional and international levels. The [communiqué](#) called for member states to ensure a 'more equal representation of women in all leadership roles within both military and civilian capabilities' and for their involvement in all peace spectrums, including the design of the peace processes and their implementations.

Women peacekeepers in Somalia, in both AMISOM and ATMIS, were featured in the discussions. In both AMISOM and ATMIS

¹⁰ Bineta Diop, Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on WPS; Javier Nino Perez, Permanent Representative of the European Union Delegation to the African Union, and the statement by Nefertiti Tshibanda, representing the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), as well as Pietro Mona, Permanent Representative of the Swiss Federation to the AU addressed the Council.

women peacekeepers have been playing significant roles in safeguarding peace and security in Somalia from taking up active frontline roles in the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to leading engagements with community members.

Regarding violence perpetuated against women during situations of conflict and crisis, the PSC commended the AU Commission for the adoption of a zero-tolerance policy to sexual abuse and exploitation in PSOs. This stance was supported by a call for strict compliance with rules of international law.

While the PSC's requests to the AUC are commendable, the absence of a clear reporting mechanism and timeline risks weakening accountability and delaying the execution. The recommendations also lack meaningful engagement with Member States, missing an opportunity to distribute responsibility and leverage national capacities.

Key PSC Decision Requiring Follow-Up:

The PSC sought to

- take all necessary measures to improve peace support infrastructure to support women's specific needs;
- design and implement programs and projects aimed at strengthening women's participation in peace processes, including through encouraging equal representation of women in peace and mediation missions;
- establish rigorous monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for UNSCR 1325 (2000) and AU instruments to monitor progress made in the implementation of policies and programs for gender equality in the security sector;
- facilitate the development and implementation of Women, Peace and Security

rity NAPs and support capacity building in promoting gender equality and women's participation in peace support operations;

- facilitate the provision of medical, psychological and legal assistance to women victims of gender-based violence, especially those serving in peace support operations; and
- explore possibilities of allocating dedicated funding to gender components of peace and security, including from the Peace Fund, to ensure material support to the advancement of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES

During the consultative meeting in New York, the Council also held a Public Lecture at Yale University. On October 16, 2024, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) held its first-ever public lecture outside Africa and its second public lecture overall. The event took place at Yale University's Jackson School of Global Affairs as part of the celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the PSC. The lecture aimed to raise awareness about the PSC's work. It focused on fostering partnerships, particularly in research on peace, security, and development in Africa.



Public Lecture of the AU PSC at Yale University

In addition to the public lecture, members of the Committee of Experts (CoE) also engaged in a meeting with the UNSC Experts ahead of the consultation meeting. The meeting served as an opportunity for the technical experts both at the AU and UN to set the agenda, ensure between working methods as well as begin the development of the outcome documents from the convening.



MEDIA AND RESEARCH SERVICES


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Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research; training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African Union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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